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COMMON LAW, CIVIL LAW, AND THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE STATE: FROM COKE TO LOCHNER 
Noga Morag-Levine* 
In . .. most [states] on the Continent of Europe, the . . . rules . .. 
stand, to a large extent, in the form of positive statutes, or 
Codes, enacted by the arbitrary power of the sovereign, or by 
the authority of the legislative assembly, where such a body ex-
ists . .. [cod(fication] is a characteristic feature in those [states] 
which have a despotic origin, or in which despotic power, abso-
lute or qualified, is, or has been, predominant. 
James Coolidge Carter, The Proposed Codification of the 
Common Law (1884) 
The Constitution of the United States was ordained, it is true, 
by descendants of Englishmen, who inherited the traditions of 
English law and history; but it was made for an undefined and 
expanding future, and for people gathered and to be gathered 
from many nations and of many tongues. And while we take 
just pride in the principles and institutions of common law, we 
are not to forget that in lands where other systems of jurispru-
dence prevail, the ideas and processes of civil justice are also 
not unknown. Due process of law, in spite of the absolutism of 
continental government, is not alien to the code which survived 
the Roman Empire as the foundation of modern civilization in 
Europe. 
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Justice Thomas Stanley Matthews, Hurtado v. California 
(1884). Subsequently quoted in Justice Henry Billing 
Brown's opinion upholding workhour restrictions in smelt-
ers and mines. in Holden v. Hardy (1898), and in the opin-
ion of Chief Judge Alton B. Parker of the New York Court 
of Appeals in People v. Lochner (1904). 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The American administrative state emerged over the course 
of the 19th and early 20th centuries out of protracted conflict 
over the status of the common law within it. The writings of 
prominent legal commentators throughout this era attest to this 
proposition. 1 Yet the meaning and significance of the common 
law within this historical context is currently ambiguous. For a 
generation or so following the New Deal, a conventional wisdom 
on this issue did take hold: viewed through the prism of legal re-
alism.' common law ordering became synonymous with formalist 
rationalization of legal outcomes that served the interests of 
economic and political elites.' Within this narrative, the common 
law was the handmaiden of "'laissez-faire constitutionalism" and 
became indistinguishable from extreme free-market ideologies.~ 
1. James Kent. Francis Lieber. Thomas Cooley. and Christopher Tiedeman are 
among the better known 19th century proponents of the common law. see infra Sections 
V and VI. For a discussion of 19th-century writings revolving around the ""rule of com-
mon law."' see WILLIAM J. NOVAK. THE PEOPLE'S WELFARE: LAW Ai'<D REGULATIO:\ 
I'.; NI'-.;ETEENTH CE:STl"RY AMERICA 35-42 (1996). 
2. On the role of prominent legal realists within the New Deal administration. see 
L-\L"RA KALMA:S. LEGAL REALISM AT YALE 130-36 ( 1986 ). 
3. See NEIL DL.XBL'RY. PATTERNS OF A\IERICAI\ JURISPRl'DE:"CE 25 (1995) 
(stating that legal formalism became aligned with laissez faire through the decisions of 
Lochner-era courts. and that the legal realists sought to attack this ""judicial world-
view.""). On the realists distrust of precedent and their conception of judicial opinions as 
post-hoc rationalizations. see KALMAN .. >11pra note 2. at 21-24 (1986). 
4. BENJA!\.11:\ R. TWISS. LAWYERS AND THE CONSTITUTION: HOW LAISSEZ FA!RE 
CAME TO THE SL'PREME COURT 34 (1942). Echoes of the argument appear in Cass Sun-
stein's writings during the late 1980s. See e.g.. Cass Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy. 87 
COLL'M. L. REv. 873. 917 (1987). ("The Lochner Court required government neutrality 
and was skeptical of government ·intervention': it defined both notions in terms of 
whether the state had threatened to alter the common law distribution of entitlements 
and wealth. which was taken to be a part of nature rather than a legal construct.""). For a 
relatively recent restatement of the view equating late 19th century common law reason-
ing with laissez-faire ideologies. see Gerald B. Wetlaufer. Systems of Belief in Modern 
American Law: A View from Century's End. 49 AM. U. L. REV. 1. 13-14 (1999) ('"The 
academic formalists were strongly predisposed in favor of ·private' common law .... If 
thev had a ·science· it was a science of the common law. Their commitment to private 
co~mon law co-existed. perhaps inevitably. with a commitment to the rights of private 
property. the freedom and sanctity of contract. the priority of private over public inter-
ests. and a resistance to legislative reform. For their part. the formalists on the Supreme 
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Its putative opposite was nothing more than sensible govern-
mental involvement in society and the economy in pursuit of 
remedies to the inefficiencies and inequities of the marketplace. 
Defined in this fashion, the controversy surrounding the com-
mon law was a relic of an earlier era that had been resolved once 
and for all when the New Deal buried laissez-faire constitution-
alism. By implication, the conflict had little relevance to con-
temporary political life. 
One cornerstone of this construction was a long-dominant 
interpretation of Lochner v. New York.' For much of the 20th 
century, the case stood for judicial usurpation of the common 
law for partisan purposes." In the 1970s, however, legal historians 
began to call into question the thesis equating the Lochner deci-
sion with unvarnished laissez-faire ideologies. The intervening 
decades have produced a wealth of revisionist scholarship that 
has challenged, in various ways. the notion that in order to in-
validate the workhour restriction at issue in the case, the 
Lochner Court invented a constitutional rationale out of whole 
cloth.7 In the process, this line of research cast serious doubt on 
previous equations between laissez-faire and common law con-
stitutionalism. One logical implication of this shift is the reopen-
ing of what was once seen as a resolved question: What defined 
the administrative paradigm against which common law ordering 
was pitted, and what was at stake in the choice between the two 
during the Lochner era? 
Court appear to have begun with their commitments to laissez-fain~. to the rights of 
propertv owners. and. at least occasionallv. to the interests of the industries thev had 
served ~hile in private practice ... ). • · 
5. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
6. See discussion in HOWARD GILL'.IA~. THE CO:\STITL'Tl0" BESIEGED 2--4 
(1993). 
7. The following is a partial list of leading works falling under the umbrella of 
Lochner revisionism: Charles W. McCurdy. Jusrice Field and rhe Jurisprudence of Gm·-
ernmenr-Business Relarions: Some Paramerers of ""Laisse::-faire" Consrifllfionalism. 1863-
1897.61 1. AM. HIST. 970. 971-73 (1975): Stephen A. Siegel. Understanding rhe Lochner 
Era: Lessons from rhe Conrroversy over Railroad and Uri/it\' Rare Regularion. 70 VA. L. 
REV. 187. 189-92 ( 1984 ): Michael Les Benedict. Laisse::.-Faire and Liha£\'.' A Re-
Evaluarion of rhe Meaning and Origins of Laisse::.-Faire Consrirllfionalism. 3 LAW & 
HIST. REV. 293 (1985): Sunstein. supra note 4: GILLMA:\. supra note 6: OWEN M. FISS. 
HISTORY OF THE SL:PREME COL'RT OF THE UNITED STATES: TROUBLED BEGit\t\Ii'iGS 
OF THE MODERN STATE. 1888-1910 (1993): BARRY CLSH\IA'>. RETH!t\Kl:\G THE NEW 
DEAL COURT: THE STRUCTURE OF A CONSTITl'TIOI'iAL RE\'OLl'Tl0'-1 (1998):David E. 
Bernstein. Lochner Era Rn·isionism, Revised: Lochner and rhe Orir;ins of Fwulamemal 
Righrs Consrirurionalism. 92 GEO. L.J. I (2003). In June 2005 Boston Universitv Law Re-
view published a symposium on the occasion of Lochner's centennial. which e~gaged the 
debate on Lochner revisionism from a variety of perspectives. ~ ~ 
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This article argues that continental civil law provided the 
competing paradigm to that of the common law, and that at the 
core of these respective regimes stood divergent models of ad-
ministrative governance.8 The civil law model relied on central-
ized, agency-based, state administration aimed at the implemen-
tation of regulatory standards through expert legislators and 
bureaucrats. The common law model fundamentally distrusted 
bureaucratic administration, and as a consequence, identified 
courts as the proper locus for administrative governance. In con-
trast with the civil law, it gave judges and juries the final say on 
the necessity of regulatory interventions to protect public health 
and safety, empowering them to oversee actions by both admin-
istrators and legislators. The choice between these models was at 
the very core of late 19th-century police-power debates.9 
The use of the term "police power" as a synonym for regu-
latory authority itself attests to the influence in America of con-
tinental models of administration. Police {polizei in German) 
was at its essence a continental concept connoting a family of 
regulatory institutions in the German cameralist vein. 10 Within 
that tradition, both the meaning of public interest and the means 
necessary to protect it were a matter of sovereign prerogative. A 
countervailing common-law-based view delimited the state's 
regulatory authority under the police power to actions the courts 
would uphold as properly designed to enforce public nuisance 
law. The latter was defined, in turn, as the authority to protect 
public health, safety, morals, and sometimes welfare. This for-
mula permitted, at least in theory, a very broad scope of gov-
ernmental interventions, few of which could not be construed to 
serve at least one of these goals. Given this broad substantive 
scope, the primary difference between this common law version 
K On the link between legal procedure and divergent conceptions of state author-
itv under civil and common law. see MIRJAN R. DAMASKA. THE FACES OF JUSTICE AND 
STATE AUTHORITY (1986). 
9. To say that civil and common law represented competing visions of administra-
tive governance is in no way to suggest a paucity of civil law influences within 19th-
century judicial opinions and legal treatises. Examples of such influence abound. The 
conflict at issue revolved instead around the propriety of following continental models of 
administration by placing ultimate regulatory authority in the hands of legislators and 
administrators rather than judges. On civil law influences during the 19th century. see 
Mathias Reimann. Introduction: Patterns of Reception. in THE RECEPTION OF 
CONTINENTAL IDEAS IN THE COMMON LAW WORLD. 1820-1920. at 7 (Mathias Reimann 
ed .. 1993). See also R.H. Helmholz. Continental Law and Common Law: Historical 
Strangers or Companions?. 1990 DUKE L.J. 1207. 1221-27 and James Gordley. The 
Common Law in the Twentieth Century: Some Unfinished Business 88 CALIF. L. REV. 
1815 (2000). 
10. See discussion infra Part IV. 
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and its continental counterpart was not in the regulatory domain 
which it defined. Instead the cardinal difference pertained to 
which institution should be entrusted with ultimate regulatory 
decision-making authority, and, by implication, the standards 
that ought to govern regulatory interventions. The continental 
model provided for regulatory decisions informed by legislative 
and administrative expertise. The common law gave precedence 
to the communal norms and lay knowledge that juries could 
bring to regulatory decisions and the specialized knowledge of 
legally-trained judges. From this distinction followed important 
implications regarding the utilization of law as an instrument of 
social and economic change. The civil law made possible an in-
terventionist and reformist model of administrative government: 
by contrast, the common law imposed significant barriers before 
the implementation of state-initiated social and economic re-
forms. Not coincidentally, reform agendas of this type often 
made their way to the United States from France, Germany and 
elsewhere on the continent. 
Fear of the influence of radical French immigrants helped 
spawn the passage of the 1798 Alien and Sedition Acts. 11 These 
attitudes continued into the Jacksonian period with Democrats 
and Whigs taking opposing views on immigration from the con-
tinent and the reformist agendas these immigrants carried with 
them. 12 The 1848 revolutions in Europe greatly sharpened this 
divide with the subsequent arrival of hundreds of thousands of 
refugees from the continent,13among them an influential group of 
radical reformers who took on transformative agendas across 
multiple social and political spheres. 14 By the 1870s a new chan-
nel for the importation of continental reforms had opened as 
American students began to attend German universities in grow-
ing numbers. Upon their return, these students perceived "an 
acute sense of a missing 'social' strand in American politics," his-
torian Daniel Rodgers has argued. 15 Subsequent years saw an in-
11. Alien Enemies Act. ch. 66. 1 Stat. 577 (1798): The Naturalization Act. ch. 54. 1 
Stat. 566 ( 1798): Alien Enemies Act. ch. 58. 1 Stat. 570 ( 1798): Sedition Act, ch. 74. 1 
Stat. 596 (1798). See RICHARD BUEL. JR .. SECURING THE REVOLUTION: IDEOLOGY IN 
AMERICAN POLITICS. 1789-1815. at 1-7 (1972); CHARLES DOWNER HAZE:-.1. 
CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN OPINION OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 140-45 (1897): 
STANLEY ELKINS & ERIC MCKITRICK. THE AGE OF FEDERALISM 309. 311. 354-55 
(1993). 
12. ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER. JR .. THE AGE OF JACKSON 320--21 (1953). 
13. See discussion infra Part V. 
14. CARL WITTKE. REFUGEES OF REVOLUTION: THE GERMAN FORTY-EIGHTERS 
IN AMERICA 1 (1952). 
15. DANIEL RODGERS. ATLANTIC CROSSINGS 111 ( 1998). 
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flux of imported administrative reform proposals and legislative 
blueprints into the United States, e.g .. workingmen's insurance. 
urban planning. and cooperative farming. 16 Across these and 
other reform projects. the driving engine was ideological change 
brought about through unprecedented exposure to European 
political sentiments. And. as was the case throughout the 19th 
century. the agents who carried these continental-inspired re-
forms confronted a countervailing array of "pitchmen for made-
in-America-only ideas and politics. " 1-
Efforts to stem the various waves of continental influence 
throughout the 19th century drew on the same central argument: 
the putative absolutist propensity of continental states. Within 
this line of argument. the common law was made a cornerstone 
of Anglo-American liberty: the civil law was the threatening an-
tithesis. Throughout the 19th century. leading jurists repeatedly 
glorified the common law through direct contrast with the civil 
law. James Kent did so in 1811 in a leading opinion that invoked 
the common law's difference from the civil law as justification 
for the protection of vested rights. 1" and he returned to the 
theme in his Commentaries (published between 1826-1830). 19 In 
his 1853 treatise On Civil Liberty and Self-Government in the 
United States. Francis Lieber contrasted the benefits of what he 
termed "Anglican liberty," a system of government founded in 
common law. with the type of "Gallican liberty" for which lead-
ers of the 1848 revolutions rallied. 20 Throughout much of the 
16. Similarly to Rodgers. Theda Skocpol recognized the influence of foreign exam-
ples on progressive initiatives. In her description. ··[p ]ioneering American advocates of 
workingmen ·s insurance and labor regulations ... were reformist professionals who 
sought to adapt foreign policy precedents to U.S. social needs and governmental condi-
tions ... THEDA SKOCPOL. PROTECTI:\G SOLDIERS A"\D MOTHERS 161 (1992). The trans-
national aspect of the progressive story is not central to Skocpol"s analysis. however. Her 
focus. instead. is on the significance of factors specific to the American polity-the im-
pact of Civil War pensions and voluntary women's organizations-in explaining the dis-
tinct trajectory of American social policy at the start of the 20th century. /d. 
17. RODGERS. supra note 15. at 4. 
18. Dash v. Van Kleek. 7 Johns. 477 (N.Y. 1811). Chancellor Kent's opinion in the 
case included the following language on the difference between the civil and common 
Jaw tradition: "Our case is happily very different .... With us. the power of the lawgiver 
is limited and defined: the judicial is regarded as a distinct. independent power: private 
rights have been better understood and more exalted in public estimation as well as se-
cured by provisions dictated by the spirit of freedom. and unknown to the civil law. Our 
constitutions do not admit the power assumed by the Roman prince: and the principle we 
are considering is now to be regarded as sacred ... /d. at 505. 
19. The common Jaw. Kent wrote. is "eminently conducive to the growth of civil 
Jibertv: and it is in no instance disgraced by such a slavish political maxim as that with 
which the Institutes of Justinian are introduced." JAMES KENT. COMMENTARIES 0:-.' 
C0\1~10-.; LAW. VOL. I 321-22. 
20. FRA-.;CIS LIEBER. 0:-.' CIVIL LIBERTY ASD SELF-GOVERNMENT (Theodore D. 
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19th century. opponents countered codification initiatives with 
warnings about the absolutist tendencies of the civil law. This 
clash came to a head during the 1880s with the fight over the 
passage of a proposed Civil Code in New York. James C. 
Carter's 1884 anti-codification pamphlet. quoted above. epito-
mized a prevalent view among American lawyers of the time re-
garding the existence of fundamental and irreconcilable political 
incompatibilities between the civil law and common law tradi-
tions. This same argument-amplified into a constitutional 
claim-was at the heart of the era's police-power debates. 
Among the transplanted legislative reforms of the time. the 
work-hour restrictions at issue in Lochner were particularly con-
troversial.'1 Continental Europe was not directly mentioned in 
the case. and perhaps for this reason. the vast scholarship on 
Lochner's meaning and origin has not drawn a connection be-
tween the decision and the longstanding debate on the civil law's 
constitutional status in America. Significantly. however. the civil 
law's compatibility with due process figured prominently in three 
key opinions leading up to Lochner. The first was Hurtado v. 
California (1884 ). a criminal procedure case which included an 
emphatic statement upholding the legitimacy of following civil 
law institutions, as quoted above. The second was Holden v. 
Hardy (1898), which validated work-hour limits in smelters and 
mines, and reproduced Hurtado's statement on the civil law in 
support of its own position." And the third was the New York 
Court of Appeals decision in People v. Lochner,'' which again 
incorporated a substantial segment of the same passage. Across 
these three opinions. the justices who wrote for the majority 
took pains to emphasize that the American constitution was 
compatible with both civil-law and common-law-based regula-
tory institutions. Justice Rufus Peckham, who wrote for the ma-
jority in Lochner, rejected that premise, albeit implicitly. His 
opinion avoided direct reference to the civil law (for reasons that 
will be discussed below). However, an encoded reference to con-
tinental governance can be found in his warning that a police 
Woolsey ed .. 3d ed. 1877) (1853 ). On Anglican liberty see chapter 5. beginning with page 
51. On Gallican liberty see chapter 24. pages 279-96. For further discussion of Lieber's 
view of the relationship between common law and Iibertv see discussion infra Part V. 
21. On the role of Bismarck's workers· insurance program in stimulating labor leg-
islation. including workhour restrictions. from the 1880s onward. see SKOCPOL. supra 
note 16. at 160. 
22. 169 U.S. 366. 388-89 (1898) (quoting Hurtado v. California. 110 U.S. 516. 530 
(1884)). 
23. 177 N.Y. 145. 150-51 (1904). 
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power whose implementation was devoid of judicial oversight 
would ''become another and delusive name for the supreme sov-
ereignty of the state. "24 The statement seems geared at marking a 
clear distinction between police regulation in its continental in-
carnation, and within the boundaries of a common law regime. 
Importantly, in Justice Peckham's formulation, the core distinc-
tion between the two was not in the permitted scope of regula-
tory action. Instead it pertained, first and foremost, to the role of 
courts in ensuring that "health and safety'' were the true ration-
ale for regulation, rather than a ''mere pretext."25 
The predominant reading of Lochner has long construed the 
case as marking the ascendance of substantive common-law-
based constitutional limitations on the ends towards which the 
state may intervene in the market. "Substantive due process" 
became the catch phrase for the doctrinal maneuver that the 
Lochner Court was thought to have implemented under this in-
terpretation. Implicit in this term was the suggestion that in 
Lochner, the Court construed the words "due process" in the 
14th Amendment to be synonymous with a list of substantive 
common law limitations. Yet in choosing to defend the work-
hour limit as a health law-a common-law-compatible ration-
ale-the state of New York made the existence of substantive 
limitations tangential to the case. The Court invalidated the law 
because, in its judgment, there was "no reasonable foundation 
for holding this to be necessary or appropriate as a health law to 
safeguard the public health or the health of the individuals who 
are following the trade of a baker."26 The state was entitled to 
impose "reasonable conditions" on property, liberty, and by ex-
tension freedom of contract, under the 14th Amendment. But 
what was, and was not reasonable, was-the Court ruled in 
Lochner- for the justices to decide. 27 
In this way. there were two distinct prongs-substantive and 
procedural- within Lochner-era jurisprudence on the police 
power. Substantively, the question pertained to whether the 
state might regulate in the interests of social goals beyond the 
protection of life, liberty and property as defined by common 
law. The procedural issue was separate, though related. It per-
tained to the identity of the institution entrusted with evaluating 
the fit between an alleged regulatory end and a particular inter-
24. Lochner v. New York. 198 U.S. 45.56 (1905). 
25. !d. 
26. /d. at 58. 
27. !d. at 53. 
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vention. One view assigned this role to legislative and adminis-
trative bodies: the other to courts. Lochner marked the ascen-
dance of the view that it was up to judges to decide on the rea-
sonableness of regulatory interventions. In other words, it took a 
direct position only on the procedural prong of due process. 
Lochner scholarship has generally devoted little attention to the 
decision's procedural prong. Rather, it has organized its inquiry 
around the substantive question: What constitutional principle, if 
any, restricted the scope of the police power to the protection of 
common law rights?c~ By contrast, this article aims to show that 
the scope of judicial oversight over regulatory decision-making 
was itself the central principle at issue in Lochner-era police-
power debates. The article further argues that the existence of 
this authority was understood to be the core distinction separat-
ing the civil law and common law regulatory paradigms. 
In insisting that it, rather than the New York legislature, 
had final authority to rule on the reasonableness of regulation, 
the Lochner Court invoked a deeply entrenched principle in the 
history of common law constitutionalism. Its origins, as discussed 
in more detail below, date to England of the late 14th and early 
15th century.cY The catalyst that sparked this line of constitu-
tional argument was the rise of absolutist government on the 
continent, and the efforts of English monarchs to institute simi-
lar regimes at home. Common law theory distinguished the 
rights of Englishmen from those of Frenchmen and later Ger-
mans, positing a powerful counterclaim to those in England who 
sought to emulate the centralizing and interventionist regulatory 
models that were gaining ground on the continent. In contrast 
with civil law, the common law was said to give courts authority 
to rule on the reasonableness of state interference with pro-
tected rights. In this manner, it barred the exercise of an abso-
lute royal prerogative of the type continental monarchs could 
claim. 
Considered against this backdrop, Lochner stands less as a 
watershed than as signpost in a centuries-long journey in which 
advocates of continental-styled administration encountered de-
fenders of the common law state. This same battle would reach 
another high point during the 1930s when prominent leaders of 
the American Bar Association (ABA) denounced New Deal 
2R See infra Part VII. 
29. See discussion infra Section II. 
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agencies as akin to Soviet-style "administrative absolutism.""' In 
this the ABA continued within a longstanding tradition of com-
mon law advocacy predating Sir Edward Coke's conflicts with 
James I and a royalist cadre of civil lawyers.' 1 Across these and 
many other examples in England and the U.S., efforts at trans-
planting regulatory and political institutions from the continent 
triggered controversy over alternative legal paradigms and mod-
els of administrative governance. Importantly. members of the 
legal profession occupied leading positions on both sides of this 
divide. 32 
The tension between civil and common law models of ad-
ministration received scant attention within post-New-Deal legal 
and constitutional history. Instead. the constructed dichotomy 
between ''laissez faire" and ''the welfare state" came to replace 
the common law/civil law axis. In the process, a crucial dimen-
sion of 19th-century regulatory history has receded from view. 
Reconstruction of this partially lost narrative is a legal historical 
imperative. But the motivations impelling this inquiry are not 
purely historical. Globalization has intensified and accelerated 
processes of transnational legal borrowing across both sides of 
the Atlantic. Consequently, contrasts and similarities between 
American and European regulatory philosophies and practices 
(and the degree of legal convergence taking place across both 
sides of the Atlantic) are currently a topic of significant aca-
demic discussion." In constitutional law. strong differences of 
opinion sur~o_und the Su~reme Court's increased proeensity to 
cite the dec1Slons of foreign (often European) courts: In these 
and other areas, the historical conflict between civil and common 
30. Report of the Special Committee on Administrative Law. 63 A.B.A. A!'JNUAL 
REPORT 331.334 (1938). 
31. See infra Part III. 
32. See infra Parts IV and V. 
33. See generally Robert A. Kagan, Globalization and Legal Change: The 'Ameri-
canization' of European Law?. 1 REG. & GOVERNA:-ICE 99 (2007). Daniel R. Keleman, 
Suing for Europe: Adversarial Legalism and European Governance, 39 COMP. POL. 
STUD. 101 (2006). Cass R. Sunstein. Risk and the Law: Precaution Against What? The 
Availability Heurist and Cross-Cultural Risk Perception. 57 ALA. L. REV. 75 (2005). Jona-
than B. Wiener, Whose Precaution After All? A Comment on the Comparisons and Evo-
lution of Risk Regulation Systems, 13 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 207 (2003). See infra Sec-
tion VII. 
34. See Noga Morag-Levine, Judges, Legislators, and Europe's Law: Common-Law 
Constitutionalism and Foreign Precedents, 65 MD. L. REV. 32 (2006) (arguing that the 
hold of the view that due process excluded the importation of civil law institutions may. 
in part. account for why the practice of Supreme Court citation to foreign precedents has 
triggered more controversy in America than most elsewhere in the world.) 
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law paradigms is vital to an understanding of current debates re-
garding the transplantation of law and policy. 
The remainder of the article proceeds as follows. Part II fol-
lows the emergence of the concept of common law supremacy in 
early modern England, in response to the Crown's reliance on 
civil-law-inspired adjudicatory bodies. Within this context. the 
distinction between natural and artificial (legally-trained) reason 
came to justify the subordination of governmental decisionmak-
ing to common law. The writings of Roscoe Pound and Edward 
Corwin during the 1920s attest to the salience. and contested 
meaning, of this historical chapter within early 20th-century de-
bates on the role of courts in the administrative state. Part Ill 
considers the economic and political background against which 
the idea first took hold that Englishmen were entitled by right to 
common law adjudication. The rise of mercantilist states was 
central to this development, as Fortescue's 15th-century writings 
make evident. Common law limitations on the scope of preroga-
tive authority served in this connection to stem the incursion of 
economic and social regulation along the absolutist French 
model. Coke, building on the Foretescue. would lend his author-
ity to the claim that the king may use the prerogative only to 
prevent dangers. and not to change the law. This argument 
would serve in time to buttress the existence of nuisance limita-
tions on the scope of the police power. The clash between "po-
lice" and common-law-based models of public health regulation 
in 18th and early 19th centuries England is the topic of Part IV. 
In this context this section examines the deployment of com-
mon-law-based models of administrative governance by oppo-
nents of Edwin Chadwick's Public Health Act of 1848. The cen-
tral charge leveled at Chadwick's program was that it emulated 
continental models of "medical police" by shifting regulatory au-
thority from judges to boards of health, violating in the process 
the nuisance-based regulatory principles of common law. The 
1848 revolutions lent added force to the view that the common 
law could deflect radicalizing continental influences. Part V 
points to the presence of a similar line of argument in the United 
States during the 1850s through analysis of Francis Lieber's dis-
tinction between Anglican and Gallican liberty. With the pas-
sage of the 14th Amendment, the choice between continental 
and common law models of administration acquired new consti-
tutional meaning, as Part VI describes. This part of the article 
contrasts the Court's treatment of the relationship between due 
process and common law in the Slaughterhouse Cases, Munn v. 
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Illinois, Hurtado, and Holden with its decision in Lochner. The 
discussion highlights the intersection during that era between 
fear of radical continental influences. opposition to codification. 
and insistence upon judicial control over health and safety regu-
lation. Finally. Part VII revisits the current debate on Lochner's 
origins and legacy. in light of the above argument. 
II. "BOARDS AND COMMISSIONS." CONCILIAR 
COURTS. AND THE SUPREMACY OF COMMON LAW 
Roscoe Pound began The Spirit of the Common Law (1921) 
with an ode to the common law's historical resilience throughout 
repeated crises "in which it seemed that an alien system might 
supersede it."·" The external threat varied across the centuries 
and included the Catholic Church, the Tudor and Stewart rulers 
of England. and the French sympathizers within the early 
American republic. But the "alien system" in question was al-
ways rooted in the Roman or Civil Law tradition of continental 
Europe. The early 20th century marked. for Pound, another 
moment of crisis within this historical chain. The threat this time 
seemed especially ominous. 
Writing against the backdrop of unprecedented growth in 
federal and state administrative power during the World War I 
years.'" Pound argued that 
the tendency to commit everything to boards and commis-
sions which proceed extrajudicially and are expected to be law 
unto themselves. the breakdown of our polity of individual 
initiative in the enforcement of law and substitution of admin-
istrative inspection and supervision. and the failure of the 
popular feeling for justice at all events which the common law 
postulates appear to threat~p a complete change in our atti-
tude toward legal problems. 
Importantly. Pound placed part of the blame for the grow-
ing appeal of this form of bureaucratic management on the cor-
ruption of historical common law principles during the late 19th 
century. Extreme individualism, an inflexible aversion to legisla-
35. ROSCOE POL':-;o. THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW 5 (1921). 
36. Robert C. Post. Defending the Lifeworld: Substantive Due Process in the Taft 
Court. 78 B.U. L Rev. 1489. 1491 (1998) (""Wartime mobilization had actualized hitherto 
unthinkable forms of state intervention. and the question looming over the dawning dec-
ade of the twenties was whether these new possibilities would remain within the potential 
repertoire of domestic state regulation during times of peace ... ). 
37. POL':-;D. supra note 35. at 7. 
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tion, and a general failure to adapt to the demands of industrial 
society-positions "out of line with [true] common law"'x- had 
all strengthened the hand of advocates of administrative auton-
omy from judicial controls. With the hope of spurring internal 
reform, Pound sought in The Spirit of the Common Law to show 
where and why late 19th-century doctrine deviated from authen-
tic common law principles. He identified three such principles, 
or institutions: judicial precedent, trial by jury, and "the doctrine 
of the supremacy of law.'' 19 The latter he defined as "a doctrine 
that the sovereign and all the agencies thereof are bound to act 
upon principles, not according to arbitrary will[;] are obliged to 
conform to reason, instead of being free to follow caprice."""' 
For Pound, an encounter in 1608 between James I and Sir 
Edward Coke marked the moment in which the supremacy of 
law crystallized as a paramount common law principle. At the 
heart of that encounter. as Pound explained, was the king's au-
thority to take cases away from the courts so that he could rule 
on them himself. James claimed such an authority by saying '"I 
thought law was founded upon reason, and I and others have 
reason as well as the judges." To which Coke responded that 
"'causes which concern the life or inheritance or goods or for-
tunes of his subjects are not to be decided by natural reason. but 
by the artificial reason and judgment of the law. which law is an 
art which required long study and experience before that a man 
can attain to the cognizance of it."41 When James objected that it 
would be treason to suggest that he was subordinate to the law, 
Coke offered in final retort that "'the king ought not to be under 
any man but under God and the law. "42 
Pound had two purposes in retelling this story. The first was 
to place the principle of legal supremacy at the very core of 
common law history and to argue that this principle did not lose 
its potency with the shift from monarchy to democracy. At the 
same time, Pound was intent on showing that judicial obstruction 
of social legislation was neither required by, nor consistent with, 
the supremacy of law. 41 Supremacy of law meant instead the 
38. !d. at 30. 
39. !d. at 65. 
40. !d. at 64. 
41. 7 SIR EDWARD COKE. REPORTS 65. quoted in POL:\D. supra note 35. at Iii. 
42. !d. 
43.[i]n insisting on the supremacy of law. the common law is not hound of neces-
sity to stand always against the popular will in the interest of the abstract indi-
vidual. Rather its true position is one of standing for ultimate and more impor-
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subordination of administrative processes to judicial review.+~ 
His justification for the necessity of judicial review of admini-
stration echoed Coke: "Men are not born with intuitions of the 
principles by which justice may be attained through the public 
adjudication of controversies. The administration of justice is not 
an easy task to which every man is competent. ... , Pound per-
ceived a direct parallel between the challenge posed by the rise 
of administrative power during his own time and that of Coke as 
he explained: 
It seemed that judicial justice. administered in courts. was to 
be superseded by executive justice administered in adminis-
trative tribunals or by administrative officers. In other words 
there was a reaction from justice according to law to justice 
without law. in this respect entirely parallel to the present 
movement away from the common-law courts in the United 
States.4" 
The ''administrative tribunals" to which Pound referred in 
the statement above included several adjudicatory bodies whose 
common denominator was that they operated outside of the 
three common law courts: the Court of Common Pleas, the 
Court of King's Bench and the Court of Exchequer. The non-
common law adjudicatory bodies included the ecclesiastical 
courts and a variety of prerogative, or conciliar, courts (named 
after the King's council). Prominent among these were the 
Chancery. the Admiralt1 courts, the Court of Star Chamber, and 
the Court of Requests! Antagonism between the competing ju-
risdictions provided the impetus for James I's summation of the 
judges of England in 1608, but predated James's reign by several 
centuries. as discussed below. 
At least since the reign of Edward I (1272-1307), the king's 
council had taken on adjudicative functions in instances where 
common law remedies were deemed insufficient. The scope of 
the Council's judicial activities increased considerably over the 
course of the 15th century, and under the reign of Henry VIII 
(1509-1547) it became a full-fledged court, known as the Court 
tant social interests as against the more immediately pressing but less weighty in-
terests of the moment. 
Poc:-;o. supra note 35. at 81. 
++. !d. at 83. 
45. !d. at 82. 
46. !d. at 72-73. 
-P. See J.H. BAKER. AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 101-09 (2d 
ed. 1979). 
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of Star Chamber.~' The Court of Requests, another conciliar 
court, came into being during the 14th century with the goal of 
serving the causes of poor men. The various alternative courts 
relied, to varying degrees, on continental legal procedures in-
stead of those of common law. Decision-making authority was 
concentrated in the hands of judges (rather than juries); judges 
took active part in the interrogation of witnesses and entertained 
requests for summary judgment. Indictments proceeded via "in-
formations" brought by state officials. The subsequent popular-
ity of these courts followed from their streamlined and efficient 
procedure, and their independence from the landed interests 
that held sway over the common law courts.~~ At the same time 
the broad discretion these institutions conferred upon judges 
opened the door to abuse and arbitrary power.'0 Under the Stu-
arts the Court of Star Chamber became notorious for its prose-
cution of sedition and other political offenses in a process that 
consisted of indictment by information and summary adjudica-
tion without a jury.'1 
Sometime during the 14th century, the idea took hold that 
adjudication under common law procedure (rather than alterna-
tive royal institutions) was "an Englishman's birthright.'''2 Chap-
ter 29 of the Magna Carta emerged in this connection as a foun-
dational text. That chapter declared that no free man may suffer 
interference with his property or freedom "except by the lawful 
judgment of his peers and by the law of the land."" Law of the 
land transformed into "due process" in some later versions of 
the Magna Carta. and both phrases became synonymous with 
common law in the view of those who challenged the authority 
of alternative royal tribunals.'~ A series of due process statutes 
were subsequently enacted over the course of the 14th and 15th 
centuries with the goal of creating "legal restraints on the power 
of the Crown to erect new courts and jurisdictions."" Coke's 
48. See A.R. MYERS. ENGLAKD IN THE LATE MIDDLE AGES 198 (2d ed. 1963). 
49. !d. at 198. In particular. the Court of Star Chamber often served as a forum for 
suing powerful individuals who were likely to escape punishment under common law. 
Partially for this reason. it was viewed favorably by the general populace throughout 
most of the 16th century. See DANIEL R. COQCILLETTE. THE ANGLO-AMERICAN 
LEGAL HERITAGE 208 (2d ed. 200-l). 
50. BRIAN P. LEVACK. THE CIVIL LAWYERS IN ENGLA:\D. 1603-1641. at 156 
(1973). 
51. BAKER. supra note 47. at 103. 
52. /d. at 82. 
53. /d. at 4. 
54. RODNEY L. MOTT. DUE PROCESS OF LAW 4-5 ( 1926 ). 
55. BAKER. supra note 47. at 83. 
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writings during the 17th century would cement the notion that 
due process required property rights to be subject exclusively to 
common law adjudication. Like the 14th-century barons who 
first advanced this line of argument, Coke sought to secure the 
common law's domain against incursion by alternative judicial 
institutions. 
Professional competition between common-law- and civil-
law-trained lawyers contributed to the rising jurisdictional ten-
sion at the start of the 17th century. Until the middle of the 13th 
century. most English lawyers received their education on the 
continent. Around that time, however, legal education institu-
tions were established in England.'" In time two alternative 
tracks developed for entering England's legal profession. One 
path required study at Oxford, Cambridge or one of the univer-
sities on the continent, culminating in the Doctor in Civil Law 
degree. The other required apprenticeship in legal inns, after 
which students were called to the bar.'' Graduates of the first 
track became known as civilians. and graduates of the second 
were called common lawyers. The common lawyers dominated 
the ranks of England's legal profession by a large margin.'~ 
Nonetheless. civilians occupied positions of significant influence 
in the royal bureaucracies of both the Tudor and Stewart 
crowns." They were the sole practitioners in actions brought be-
fore the High Court of Admiralty. the central ecclesiastical 
courts (whose jurisdiction included probate, matrimonial andes-
tate cases), and the Chivalry courts."" They also served (along 
with common lawyers) as judges in the Court of Star Chamber, 
the Court of Requests, the Council of the North and the Chan-
cery."1 Civil lawyers and common lawyers aligned with opposite 
sides in the political divisions of early 17th-century England. 
With very few exceptions. civilians sided with the monarchy and 
the English Church."2 The common lawyers were less unanimous. 
but on the whole their allegiance was with the Puritans and the 
Parliament. At the turn of the 17th century, however, they faced 
a professional crisis marked by shortage of jobs and reduction of 
56. NORMA:S F. CANTOR. IMAGINING THE LAW: COMMO:S LAW AND THE 
FOLSDA TIONS OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTE:\1 42 ( 1997). 
57. BAKER. supra note 47. at 138-40. 
58. Although there were onlv 200 civilian lawvers in the period between 1603 and 
1641. there were"close to 2000 common lawyers. LE\i ACK. supra note 50. at 3. 
59. COQL'ILLETE. supra note 49. at 218: LEVACK. supra note 50. at 124. 
60. LEVACK. supra note 50. at 219. 
61. !d. at 124. 
62. !d. at 3. 
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fees."' Although a variety of factors contributed to their decline, 
the civil lawyers tended to blame the common lawyers' increas-
ing use of prohibitions.M 
Prohibitions took the form of orders from judges in com-
mon law courts to their colleagues on other courts to halt pro-
ceedings that the common law judges considered to fall exclu-
sively within their jurisdiction."' A prohibition would put a 
temporary halt to the proceedings and would be followed by a 
conference in which the judges within the challenged court could 
make the case as to why jurisdiction should remain with them. 
When they failed, the case had to be refiled within a common 
law court. The turn of the 17th century brought a marked in-
crease in the use of this procedure.Oii Soon after the inauguration 
of James I, the civilians petitioned him and the Archbishop of 
Canterbury to intervene." They claimed that the authority to ad-
judicate jurisdictional disputes of this type properly belonged 
with the king (rather than the common lawyers) on two counts. 
The first was that courts of common law were equal, rather than 
superior. to civilian and prerogative courts. The second followed 
from the king's historical right to settle disputes in person.N< 
James invoked the latter argument in his 1608 meeting with the 
judges. Coke cast his response in reference to the superiority of 
legal authority over the personal authority of the king. But the 
underlying question was not only, or primarily, the law's su-
premacy over the king as such. At stake instead was the meaning 
of law in this connection, or, put differently, the subordination of 
civil law institutions to those of common law. 
This debate was central to English jurisprudential thought 
already during the 15th century, as evidenced by the writings of 
Sir John Fortescue. England's leading political theorist of the 
era. He served as Chief Justice of the King's Bench between 
1442 and 1461. and followed Henry VI to France when the latter 
was deposed. While there he authored De Laudibus Legum An-
gliae (Praises of the Laws of England)."y The book's overarching 
theme was the distinctive nature and benefits of English law (in 
contradistinction from civil law). Employing a literary device 
63. /d. at 50--72. 
M. /d. at 72. 
65. !d. at 73. 
66. /d. at 73. 
67. /d. at R2. 
oR !d. at X3. 
69. SIR JOHt\ FORTESCL'E. Or-; THE LAWS AND GOVERNA!'ICE OF ENGLAND (Shel-
ley Lockwood ed .. 1997) ( 1471 ). On Fortescue·s biography. see id. at xviii-xix. 
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common in 15th-century political writings, the book takes the 
form of a dialogue between a young prince and a chancellor (a 
character Fortescue employs as a stand-in for himself). To begin 
with, the chancellor advanced the view that knowledge of law is 
as important to the prince as knowledge of arms, to which the 
prince responded with a two-part inquiry. The first expressed 
concern over the length of time required for him to attain thor-
ough knowledge of the law; the second pertained to whether he 
ought to devote himself "to the study of the laws of England or 
of the civil laws which are renowned throughout the world."70 
In response to the prince's second question, Fortescue of-
fered an extensive discussion of the many reasons supporting the 
common law's superiority over civil law. The greater antiquity of 
common law over all other systems leaves no "legitimate doubt 
but that the customs of the English are not only good but the 
best." 71 He offered a series of comparisons between civil law and 
common law adjudication to illustrate the greater protection 
common law accorded the liberty of the subject. The civil law 
admitted proof by witnesses and resorted to torture to obtain 
confessions. 72 The common law by contrast relied on juries to en-
sure that justice be done.73 Persuaded on this point, the prince 
proceeds to question why, in view of the evident superiority of 
English law, some of his "ancestors, the kings of England, were 
little pleased with their laws, and strove to introduce the civil 
laws into the government of England, and tried to repudiate the 
laws of the land"?74 To this the chancellor responded with the 
view that the civil law's appeal to earlier monarchs derived from 
the intrinsic affinity between the civil law and royal absolutism. 
Central to this was the civil law's traditional emphasis on the 
Justinian maxim, "What pleases the prince has the force of law." 
"The laws of England," by contrast, "'do not sanction any such 
maxim." 75 Notwithstanding, some English monarchs did "change 
laws at their pleasure, make new ones, inflict punishments, and 
impose burdens on their subjects, and also determine suits of 
70. !d. at 14. 
71. !d. at 27. Antiquity served in this context as evidence for the quality of English 
law under the logic that the longevity of these laws suggests that the various rulers who 
had occasion to alter them throughout history considered them better than any alterna-
tive. 
72. !d. at 30--34. 
73. !d. at 41. 
74. /d. at 49. 
75. /d. at 48. 
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parties at their own will and when they wish. "76 Elsewhere 
Fortescue explained the cardinal difference between the author-
ity of English monarchs and that of rulers under civil law 
through a distinction between royal and political power. Civil 
law conferred absolute royal power under the Justinian maxim. 
But "the king of England is not able to change the laws of his 
kingdom at pleasure, for he rules his people with a government 
not only royal but also political."77 Coke would subsequently cite 
Fortescue's last point to support the absence of legislative au-
thority to issue new law through prerogative proclamations.7x 
Coke likewise borrowed a page from Fortescue when he of-
fered the difference between natural and artificial reason as 
grounds for denying the king authority to adjudicate disputes in 
person. As mentioned, the prince responded to the chancellor's 
recommendation that he study law with doubts based on the 
lengthy time required to acquire thorough legal education. The 
chancellor answered with a distinction between two categories of 
legal knowledge: the first appropriate and sufficient for a prince; 
the second necessary for a professional judge. In one year of 
study, Fortescue's chancellor contended, the prince could ac-
quire sufficient familiarity with legal maxims and universal prin-
ciples of law, which for his purposes should suffice. But, the 
chancellor agreed with the prince, for "that expertness in laws 
the which is requisite for judges the studies of twenty years 
barely suffice." Neither was this manner of legal expertise of 
much benefit to the prince, Fortescue went on to say. Unlike 
professional judges, the prince would have "no occasion ... to 
search into the arcana of our laws with such tedious application 
and study," since it "was not customary for the Kings of England 
to sit in court or pronounce judgment themselves." The latter 
point, i.e., the impropriety of direct adjudication by the monarch, 
was the point Fortescue aimed to support through this imagined 
colloquy. Likely for the same reason Fortescue provided else-
where in the book a thorough discussion of the structure and 
thoroughness of the education English lawyers received in the 
Inns of Chancery and Inns of Court.79 
In providing an expertise-based rationale for the supremacy 
of common law, Edward Corwin contended, Fortescue laid the 
foundation for an Anglo-American tradition of higher law, a 
76. !d. 
77. !d. at 17. 
78. See discussion infra Part III. 
79. FORTESCUE. supra note 69. at 6R-75. 
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tradition that evolved in opposition to the higher-law tradition 
associated with the continent.") The roots of both higher-law tra-
ditions, Corwin emphasized, can be traced to Aristotelian con-
ceptions of "natural justice." The defining element of natural 
justice within this conception was its universality: ''that which 
everywhere has the same force and does not exist by people's 
thinking this or that."H1 Cicero would later build and expound on 
this idea when he defined "True law" as ··right reason. harmoni-
ous with nature, diffused among all. ""2 Roman rulers found the 
concept of universal law of particular value in administering an 
empire whose rule extended over many local systems of law. 
Consequently, Corwin notes, Roman jurisprudence came to 
adopt a distinction between jus civile and jus naturale. The first is 
specific to individual nations; the second is "established among 
all mankind" and "is observed equally by all peoples." This dis-
tincti?n wa~ subse9s~ently incorporated into Justinian ·s Institutes 
(pubhshed m 533).- From there the concept of natural law en-
tered medieval political discourse where its meaning subse-
quently transformed from an ideal guiding the lawmaking exer-
cise to an external constraint on the authority of lawmakers. On 
the continent, where this idea originated. the existence of natural 
limitations on the exercise of political power was largely theo-
retical. In England, by contrast, higher-law acquired actual insti-
tutional significance beginning with the 16th century.M 
Key to this divergence was the fact that in England the halo 
of higher law was conferred on common law institutions of posi-
tive law. In this fashion, common law judges became the guardi-
ans of higher law in its English incarnation. In tandem, "reason" 
came to assume a distinct meaning within English theories of 
higher law. "The right reason to which the maxims of higher law 
on the continent were addressed was always the right reason in-
voked by Cicero, it was the right reason of all men."'' James I 
80. EDWARD S. CORWIN. THE ''HIGHER LAW .. BACKGROL'~D OF AMERICA~ 
CONSTIT\JTIOI"AL LAW 37 (1955) (originally published in 42 HAR\. L. REV. 149 (1928-
1929)1. 
81. 7 ARISTOTLE. NICOMACHEAN ETHICS §§ 1-2 (Ross trans .. 1925). ci1ed in 
CORWIN. supra note 80. at 7-8. n.15. 
82. 6 LACT ANTil'S. DIVINAE lNSTITUTIONES 8. 370 (Roberts & Donaldson trans .. 
1871). ciled in CORWIN supra note 80. at 10 n.22. 
83. !d. at 17. The !nslilules was one of the four works comprising Justinian's Corpus 
Juris Civilis. 
84. !d. at 23. 
85. !d. at 26. Cicero's description of Law as "a natural force ... the mind and rea-
son of the intelligent man. the standard by which Justice and Injustice are measured ... 
MARCL'S TULLIL'S CICERO. DE LEGIBCS 1.6.19. ciled in GARY L. McDOWELL. EOCITY 
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spoke from within this tradition when he sought to defend his 
authority to act as a judge with the claim that "the law was 
founded upon reason. and that he and others had reason as well 
as the judges ... In constructing legal knowledge as a '·profes-
sional mvsterv. as the peculiar science of bench and bar,"' Fortes-
cue prov"ided ·coke with a ready-made line of response."" The re-
sult was a higher law tradition to which "right reason" was 
"judicial right reason," Corwin wrote.x7 
Corwin made this argument in an essay he published in the 
1928-9 issue of the Harvard Law Review under the title "The 
'Higher Law' Background of American Constitutional Law." 
Like Pound. he wrote with the intent of shining a historical light 
on the constitutional controversies of his day. And like Pound, 
he identified the early 17th century as a decisive moment in the 
rise of common-law-based notions of judicial supremacy. He dif-
fered from Pound in one key respect. For Corwin, common law 
ideology was a relic of an earlier age and was at odds with the 
principles of modern American constitutionalism. Whereas the 
common law justified legal supremacy in reference to its sub-
stantive content. modern constitutionalism tied the supremacy of 
law to its origin in popular sovereignty. With this reframing, 
Corwin suggested. American constitutionalism moved in the di-
rection of the continental higher law tradition. The Roman 
maxim regarding the absolute authority of the prince built on the 
claim that the prince derived his authority from the people. 
(Whatever has pleased the prince has the force of law, since the 
Roman people by the lex regia enacted concerning his imperium, 
have yielded up to him all their power and authority.'')88 As such, 
Corwin wrote, "[t]he sole difference between the Constitution of 
the United States and the imperial legislation justified in this fa-
mous text is that the former is assumed to have proceeded im-
mediately from the people, while the latter proceeded from a 
like source only mediately.''x" 
In aligning American constitutionalism with continental 
higher law principles, Corwin departed from Pound's contempo-
raneous writings on this topic. By the 1930s Corwin would be-
come one of the New Deal's most fervent supporters,"'' whereas 
A'<D THE CO:"STITl'TIO:\ 20 ( 1982). 
86. COR WI:\. supra note 80. at 38. 
87. /d. at 26. 
88. Inst. I. 2. 6 lfliOted in CORWIN. supra note 80. at 4 n. 8. 
89. /d. at 4. 
90. In 19.17 Corwin testified on behalf of Roosevelt's Court Packing Plan before the 
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Pound would emerge as a vocal critic of New Deal administra-
tive practices and a strong proponent of judicial review of ad-
ministrative action.~1 In this he understood himself to be follow-
ing in the footsteps of Coke, as his writings in The Spirit of the 
Common Law make evident. 
From its likely inception in Fortescue's writings in early 
modern England the distinction between political and legal rea-
soning took hold within a larger project geared at deflecting con-
tinental- at that point primarily French -legal and political in-
fluences. Beginning with the teachings of Fortescue and Coke, 
these doctrines distinguished "judicial reason" as defined by 
common law from universal conceptions of reason under civil 
law. Embedded within the respective constitutional frameworks 
were alternative conceptions of the administrative state. The 
first was rooted in the centralizing and reformist ambitions of 
mercantilist governance dating to early modern Europe; the sec-
ond in countervailing regulatory models that favored both de-
centralization and limited regulatory intervention in economic 
relations. 
III. COMMON LAW IDEOLOGY AND THE 
MERCANTILIST STATE 
In The Spirit of the Common Law, Pound pointed to an im-
portant and frequently neglected parallel between those who 
aligned with James I and the progressives of his time: 
[t]hose who thought of the king as the guardian of social in-
terests and wished to give him arbitrary power, that he might 
use it benevolently in the general interest, were enraged to 
see the sovereign tied down by antiquated legal bonds discov-
ered by lawyers in such musty and dusty parchments as 
9' Magna Carta. · 
Across both eras the use of the law as an instrument of so-
cial and economic change was at the heart of underlying consti-
tutional divisions. 
Senate Judiciarv Committee. Mark O'Brien. Curbing the Court, PRINCETON ALUMNI 
WEEKLY. Mar~ 8. 2006, available at http://www.princeton.edu/-paw/archive_new/ 
P A WOS-06/09-0308/features_court.html. 
91. Pound was chair of the ABA Committee on Administrative Law that was men-
tioned in the introduction. Comm. on Admin. Law, Am. Bar. Ass'n, Report of the Spe-
cial Committee on Administrative Law, 63 ANN. REP. A.B.A 331,344 (1938). 
92. POUND. supra note 35, at 63. 
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"Common law theory arose, in part." Gerald J.Postema has 
written, "in response to the threat of centralized power exercised 
by those who proposed to make law guided by nothing but their 
own assessments of the demands of justice, expediency, and the 
common good. Against the spreading ideology of political abso-
lutism and rationalism, Common Law theory reasserted the me-
dieval idea that law is not something made either by king, Par-
liament, or judges. but rather is the expression of a deeper 
reality which is merely discovered and publicly declared by 
them."9' At least since Fortescue, this claim served to distinguish 
an English model of administrative government from its coun-
terpart on the continent. But, it is important to emphasize, it was 
due to the significant influence of the continental model within 
England itself that an oppositional common law theory rose in 
the first place. 
English monarchs during the early modern period were 
steeped in the mercantilist world view that dominated political 
thought during that time. Mercantilism (a term coined by later 
historians) inherited from its medieval predecessor a commit-
ment to regulation on behalf of the common good. But it substi-
tuted a centralizing agenda for the localism that structured regu-
lation in earlier times.94 While it aimed to increase its own power 
and riches, the mercantilist state also took a paternalistic interest 
in the life of its subjects. The distinction between individual and 
collective interests was deemed meaningless in this worldview. 
In the service of state power, mercantilism sought "to make the 
state's purposes decisive in a uniform economic sphere. "9' 
Both in France and England royal authorities sought to ex-
pand their participation in industrial enterprise by claiming mo-
nopolistic power or granting monopolistic privileges to their sub-
jects. In France, the King claimed the right to manage all 
industry related to national defense (e.g., the production of gun-
powder) and to derive revenue from the mining of natural re-
sources such as minerals and metals. 96 In addition, the French 
crown conferred special privileges to individual and groups to 
foster new manufactures and technologies.97 Likewise in Eng-
93. GERALD J. POSTEMA, BENTHAM AND THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 3-4 
(1986) (emphasis in the original) 
94. JOHN U. NEF, INDUSTRY AND GOVERNMENT IN FRANCE AND ENGLAND. 1540· 
1640, at 11-12 (1940). 
95. 1 ELI F. HECKSCHER, MERCANTILISM, at 22 (1955) (1931 ). 
96. /d. at 69. 
97. /d. at 83. 
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land, both Queen Elizabeth and King James invoked national 
defense to justify a royal monopoly of the manufacture of saltpe-
ter and gunpowder."K Other patents of monopoly granted indi-
viduals powers to supervise and inspect particular branches of 
industry or trade, and still others conferred exclusive privileges 
to reward innovation, revenue procurement, or service and loy-
alty to the crown."" The result in both England and France was 
extensive regulatory effort geared at dictating the terms and 
conditions of employment and processes of manufacturing in-
dustrial goods. In both countries, the Crown took on the regula-
tion of terms of apprenticeship and wages during the later 
1500s.m' Prescriptive regulatory directives specified the materials 
and processes used in industrial production and determined the 
prices of particular products.w1 The two regimes fundamentally 
diverged, however, in the structure and efficiency of the en-
forcement and judicial institutions available to them. 
The administrative machinery at the disposal of the English 
crown was inferior in key respects to its French counterpart. 
France had a hierarchy of royal officials and a cadre of paid in-
spectors whose primary or exclusive duty was to implement the 
King's economic policy. England lacked a paid civil service like 
France's. Instead, English monarchs had to rely on the services 
of overburdened and unpaid justices of the peace. whose own 
economic interests at times cut against strict enforcement of in-
dustrial codes. 102 The absence of a reliable civil service gave rise 
to a system that delegated significant enforcement powers to 
private citizens through financial incentives of various kinds. 
Particularly significant in this respect was the role of ''common 
informers" who privately prosecuted violators of penal statutes. 
Between 1550 and 1624, common informers were "a chief in-
strument for the enforcement of economic legislation and the 
98. /d. at 89: E. LIPSON. THE ECONOMIC HISTORY OF ENGLAND. VOL. II THE AGE 
OF MERCANTILISM. 352 (6th ed. 1964). 
99. LIPSON. supra note 98. at 354-56. 
100. HECKSCHER. supra note 95. at 24. 27. Of the many economic statutes passed 
during that era the most comprehensive was the statute of artificers of 1563. Its provi-
sions included a requirement that all workmen serve an apprenticeship of seven years. as 
well as regulation of wages and hours of labor. /d. at 27. A statute enacted under the 
reign of James I went as far as to specify minimum wages to be paid. LIPSON. supra note 
98. at cii. 
101. Thus. for example. a French royal edict in 1571 fixed a uniform price for cloth. 
and another edict in 1626 established a new set of roval officials to maintain the quality 
of iron wares and to prevent the use of unsuitable ir~n by certain metal workers. Else-
where the crown prescribed exact ingredients to be used in dyeing and in the manufactur-
ing of soap and beer. :>IE F. supra note 94. at 21. 
102. HECKSCHER. supra note 95. at 246-50. 
2007] COMMON LAW, CIVIL LAW 625 
indirect taxation of the kingdom. "10' The system lent itself to cor-
ruption and abuse. and, helps explain the political salience of in-
dictment by information during Coke's time.](14 Apart from their 
weak enforcement capacity, British monarchs were disadvan-
taged relative to their French counterparts by the common law-
yers' ultimately successful opposition to extending the jurisdic-
tion of the royal courts. In France, by contrast, a large 
proportion of disputes regarding industrial legislation ended be-
fore royal courts with close affinities to the mercantilist goals of 
the regime.105 
The unconstitutionality of the French mercantilist model in 
England was the central claim of common law theory, at least 
since Fortescue. The superiority of England's legal and eco-
nomic institutions over France's is a recurrent theme in Fortes-
cue's writings. He contrasted the absolute lawmaking authority 
of French rulers with the limited prerogative of English mon-
archs: "For the king of England is not able to change the laws of 
his kingdom at pleasure, for he rules his people with a govern-
ment not only royal but also political. If he were to rule over 
them with a power only royal, he would be able to change the 
laws of the realm ... this is the sort of dominion which the civil 
laws indicate when they state that 'What pleased the prince has 
the force of law. "' 106 From this, he argued, followed a fundamen-
tal distinction between economic conditions under the absolute 
monarchy of France (royal rule), and England's constitutional 
regime. Invoking the French royal monopoly over salt as an ex-
ample, Fortescue said that in France "the king does not suffer 
anyone of his realm to eat salt, unless he buys it from the king 
himself at a price fixed by his pleasure alone. "107 "In the realm of 
England," Fortescue wrote, no one is "hindered from providing 
himself with salt or any goods whatever, at his own pleasure and 
of any vendor. .. Nor can the king there, by himself or by his 
ministers, impose tallages. subsidies, or any other burdens what-
ever on his subjects, nor change their laws, nor make new ones, 
without the concession or assent of his whole realm expressed in 
103. M.W. Beresford. The Common Informer, The Penal Statures and Economic 
Regulation. 10 ECON. HIST. REV. 221.221 (1957). 
104. Coke likened the "swarms of informers" to a comparatively recent plague of 
Egypt. SIR EDWARD COKE. THE THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF 
ENGLAND 191 (1644) [hereinafter COKE. THIRD PART]. cited in Beresford. supra note 
103. at 222. 
105. NEF. supra note 94. at 37-38. 
106. FORTESCUE. supra note 69. at 17. 
107. !d. at 50. 
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his parliament. "" 1"' The English monarch. in other words. was 
precluded from the type of unilateral economic regulation that 
was being put into effect in France. England's greater prosperity, 
he argued. followed from this constitutional difference. Eng-
land's inhabitants abound "'in gold and silver and all the neces-
saries of life.'' 1'N whereas the French "'live in no little misery. 
They drink water daily. tasting no other drink except at solemn 
feasts, They wear frocks or tabards of canvas like sack-cloth" 
and "[t]heir women are barefooted except on feast days.''llo The 
distinct constitutional structure of their realm was the English 
line of defense against the misfortunes that (by Fortescue's ac-
count) had befallen the French. 
Coke relied on Fortescue when he challenged the King's use 
of proclamations (issued as an exercise of the royal prerogative) 
as instruments of economic regulation. An exchange between 
Coke and the Lord Chancellor on the legality of two royal proc-
lamations illustrates this. 111 Under these proclamations, the King 
prohibited the construction of new buildings in London and the 
processing of wheat starch. The charge against these proclama-
tions was that they lacked "former precedent or authority in 
law." To this the Lord Chancellor retorted that "every precedent 
hath a commencement." His advice to the judges was that they 
should "maintain the power and prerogative of the King" whose 
actions are '·according to his wisdom and for the good of his sub-
jects ... Invoking Fortescue, Coke responded that "the King by 
his proclamation or other ways cannot change any part of the 
common law, or statute law, or the customs of the realm." Nei-
ther could the King "create any offence by prohibition or proc-
lamation which was not an offence before, for that was to change 
the law." The King could issue proclamations for one purpose 
only: "to prevent dangers, which it will be too late to prevent af-
terwards, he may prohibit them before, which will aggravate the 
offence if it be afterwards committed." In other words, the pres-
ervation of life and property was the only goal justifying the im-
position of economic restrictions under the royal prerogative. 112 
By the 19th century, this view would find an echo in the 
claim that the scope of legislative authority was similarly con-
fined to the preservation of life and property under nuisance 
108. !d. at 52. 
109. /d. 
110. ld. at 50. 
111. Case of Proclamations. 77 Eng. Rep. 1352. at 1353 (K.B. 1611). 
112. /d. 
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law. Writers of the era often invoked as a synonym for nuisance 
the Latin maxim 'sic 1ttere tuo ut alienum non laedas,' (use your 
own without injuri~19 another). 11 ) C~ke cited t_h~s maxim in Wil-liam Aldred's Case. a landmark nmsance dec1Slon that awarded 
damages to a plaintiff who sued his neighbor over the stench of a 
pigsty. 110 Sic utere in the context of Aldred's Case provided a 
positive rationale for legal intervention (where there existed an 
interference with the rights of others). Nineteenth-century com-
mentators read into it, however. an implicit limitation on the 
scope of regulatory action (except where injury to others is at 
stake) that was perhaps foreign to the private-law context of 
Aldred's Case. In the process they implicitly brought Coke's 
venerable authority to bear on the side of 19th-century laissez-
faire ideologies. 11 " 
Early 17th-century England provided a crucial point of ref-
erence for participants in 19th-century constitutional debates. as 
the earlier analysis of Pound and Corwin's writings on this topic 
suggested. This sense of continuity built. in turn, on foundational 
18th- and early 19th-century texts through which divisions over 
the legitimacy of continental models of administration in early 
modern England were reframed as a choice between continental 
police and nuisance-focused. common law regimes. 
113. See discussion infra Part V. VI. 
114. Aldred's Case. 77 Eng. Rep. 816. at 821 (K.B. 1611). 
115. Aldred's. 77 Eng. Rep. at 821. The complete maxim cited in the case goes as 
follows: Prohibetur ne quis facial in suo quod nocere possit alieno: et sic (g) utere tuo ut 
alienum non laedas. (It is prohibited to do on one's own property that which may injure 
another's: one should use his own property in such a manner as not to injure another). 
116. The degree of commonality between Coke's worldview and that of 19th-century 
economic liberals is a matter of historical debate. Christopher Hill. building on an article 
by Donald 0. Wagner. attributed to Coke a "bias in favour of economic liberalism." Ac-
cording to this argument. Coke consciously sought to shape the common law to serve the 
interests of industrial capitalism. CHRISTOPHER HILL, INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE 
ENGLISH REVOLUTION 233 (1965) ("Where the past offered no rule, as in the case of 
monopolies. Coke produced one for which his authorities gave no warrant, and declared 
that monopolies infringed Chapters 29 and 30 of Magna Carta."). See Donald 0. Wag-
ner, Coke and the Rise of Economic Liberalism, 6 ECON. HIST. REV. 37 (1935). Barbara 
Malament termed their position the "laissez-faire thesis" and challenged it as incompati-
ble with Coke's support in the Commons for "many statutes of 'mercantilist' nature" and 
his "profound admiration for Tudor legislation." For Coke. Malament concluded. free 
trade did not entail "a rejection of parliamentary regulation. it meant in fact trade free 
from arbitrary and exclusive privileges bestowed by the Crown." Barbara Malament, The 
"Economic Liberalism" of Sir Edward Coke. 76 Yale L.J. 1321. 1322. 1329-30, 1347 
(1967). 
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IV. CONTINENTAL POLICE AND NUISANCE LAW: 
COMPETING MODELS OF PUBLIC HEALTH 
REGULATION 18TH AND EARLY 19TH CENTURY 
ENGLAND 
Published in 1769, Volume 4 of Blackstone's Commentaries 
included a chapter entitled "Of Offences against the public 
health and the public police or oeconomy." At the start of the 
chapter. Blackstone divided offences "against the public health 
of the nation .. into three categories. The first consisted of vari-
ous quarantine requirements imposed on individuals exposed to 
infectious diseases. The second included "offences against public 
health" through "the selling of unwholesome provisions." And 
the third turned to "offences ... against the public police and 
oeconomy. w "By the public police" Blackstone explained, " I 
mean the due regulation and domestic order of the kingdom: 
whereby the individuals of the state, like members of a well-
governed family. are bound to conform their general behaviour 
to the rules of propriety, good neighbourhood, and good man-
ners: and to be decent, industrious, and inoffensive in their re-
spective stations ... 11 ' 
In the remainder of the chapter, Blackstone outlined the 
domains subject to regulation under this heading: prohibitions 
on clandestine marriages and bigamy; the banning of "gypsies" 
from England. 11 " and ''Common nuisances" defined as "a species 
of offences against the public order and oeconomical regime of 
the state; being either the doing of a thing to the annoyance of 
all the king's subjects. or the neglecting to do a thing which the 
common good requires. "1' 0 Blackstone distinguished public nui-
sances from the type of private nuisance dispute with which 
Coke was concerned in Aldred's case. He offered obstruction of 
117. -\ WILLIAM BLACKSTONE. COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 162 
(University of Chicago Press 1979) ( 1765-1769) (emphasis in the original). Blackstone did 
not define the term "oeconomy" or explain how it differed from police. L.J. Hume offers 
the following regarding the meaning of "oeconomy" in 18th century discourse. and its 
relation to police. "Oeconomy had a shorter history than police and a less well-defined 
subject-matter. It was concerned more especially with problems of public finance and in 
general with the domestic economy of the central government. But the boundaries could 
also be extended. to cover the resources and the obligations of the state (the community) 
as well as those of the government. especially where ... questions of public policy and 
public finance were intermingled. In their wider forms. police and oeconomy over-
lapped ... L.J. HL'ME. BENTHAM AND BUREAUCRACY 34 ( 1981 ). 
118. BLACKSTONE. supra note 117. 
119. !d. at 166. Blackstone notes in reference to the laws against gypsies that there 
exist no modern instances of enforcement "to the honour of our national humanity." 
120. !d. at 167. 
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public roadways, the keeping of hogs in a city or market town. 
and the running of disorderly inns and gaming houses as exam-
ples of indictable public nuisances. 121 
In providing a personal definition for "public police," 
Blackstone implicitly acknowledged the presence of an alterna-
tive conception of the term's meaning in 18th-century political 
discourse. Within this discourse, '"police" served as a referent, if 
not a synonym, for the regulatory instruments of continental 
cameralist regimes. Defined at times as the '"German equivalent 
of mercantilism,"122 cameralism identified the prosperity and 
power of the state with the wellbeing of its citizens. From this 
followed two related conclusions. First, the state had the duty to 
provide for the security and wealth of its citizens. Second, it had 
both reason and authority to regulate the lives of its citizens in 
great detail. 123 Together, these served as a foundation of a cam-
eralist administrative science that German universities began to 
institutionalize early in the 18th century through chairs in 
"Oeconomie, Policy und Kammer-Sachen'' (oeconomie. police, 
and cameralism). 124 Throughout the remainder of the century, 
cameralism and police appear as closely associated, at times 
overlapping, concepts. 
The term "police" encompassed to begin with ''both the 
condition of public order and tranquility-safety and happi-
ness-and the means to which resort was made to attain and 
preserve that condition, the 'management of the public weal. '" 12 ; 
The latter meaning assumed prominence during the 18th century 
when "police" became synonymous with a managerial science of 
government. 126 Within this context the term "medical police" 
(Medicini Po/izey) came to distinguish regulatory actions geared 
at a broadly defined public health objectives from police meas-
ures geared at criminal activity. Medical police. George Rosen 
has shown in a monumental body of work on the topic, was at its 
core a cameralist concept aimed at insuring the state of sufficient 
121. /d. at 167--DS. 
122. Hubert C. Johnson. The Concept of Bureaucran- in Cameralism. 7') POL. Scr. Q. 
378. 378 (1964 ). . 
123. H.M. Scott. Introduction: The Prohlem of Enlight<'!led Ahsolwism. in 
ENLIGHTENED ABSOLUTISM 18--19 (1990) 
124. The University of Halle established such a chair in 1727 and was soon followed 
by others. Keith Tribe. Cameralism and the Science of" Gm-ernnwnt. 5o JOL"R:\AL OF 
MODERN HISTORY 21i3. 21i3-D4 (1')84). . 
125. CHRISTOPHER TOMLINS. LAW. LABOR. A:--:D IDEOLOGY I'-" THE EARLY 
AMERICAN REPUBLIC 45 (1993). 
121i. /d. 
630 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 24:601 
size and strength. 127 A 1779 treatise on Medical Police offers an 
illustrative example of the intersection between national defense 
and public health within this regulatory model. 
The internal security of the State is the aim of the general sci-
ence of police. A very important part thereof is the science 
that teaches us to handle methodically the health of human 
beings living in society and of those animals they need to as-
sist them in their labors and for their sustenance. Conse-
quently we must promote the welfare of the population by 
means which will enable persons cheerfully and for lengthy 
periods to enjoy the advantages which social life can offer 
them ... Medical police, therefore, like the science of police in 
general, is a defensive art, is a doctrine whereby human be-
ings and their animal assistants can be protected against the 
evil consequences of crowding too thickly upon the ground. 12R 
In contrast to this state-interest-based rationale for public 
health regulation, Blackstone organized his own definition of po-
lice around the analogy between the state and "a well-governed 
family." 12y Mutual self interest, rather than national defense, is 
the justification for public health regulation within Blackstone's 
framework. By implication, a contrast is drawn between his vi-
sion of the scope and purpose of regulatory authority and the 
cameralist model making its way from the continent, though the 
text makes no explicit mention of this distinction. In this, Black-
stone differed from both Adam Smith and Jeremy Bentham, 
both of whom were careful to highlight the foreign roots of po-
lice in their own writings on the topic, although they differed 
markedly in the significance they attached to this fact. 
Smith delivered during 1762-63 a series of lectures entitled 
•·Juris Prudence or Notes from the Lectures on Justice, Police, 
Revenue and Arms ... " Within this context he argued against 
"police" as a proper model for wealth maximization, in part 
based on its foreign-specifically French-origins130 Bentham, 
writing in 1781, likewise pointed out that the word "police" 
made its way from France to England where it "still retains its 
127. GEORGE ROSEN. FROM MEDICAL POLICE TO SOCIAL MEDICINE: ESSAYS ON 
THE HISTORY OF HEALTH CARE 93 (1974). 
128. JOHAN!\ PETER FRANK. A SYSTEM OF COMPLETE MEDICAL POLICE: 
SELECTIONS FROM JOHANN PETER FRANK 12 (Erna Lesky ed .• 1976). 
129. MARKUS DIRK DUBBER. THE POLICE POWER: PATRIARCHY AND THE 
FOCNDATIONS OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT. at xii (2005) (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACK· 
STONE. COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 162 (1769). 
130. /d. at 63-M. 
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foreign garb.''L1l For Bentham, however, the desirability of 
adopting police-modeled governance was hardly diminished by 
its French pedigree. 
Smith's objective in writing about ''police" was to establish 
the superiority of a countervailing "system of natural liberty," or 
market ordering.13c As Chris Tomlin notes, ''[t)he market order 
which Smith theorized, in contrast to police ... depended upon a 
conception of unqualified property right which was itself totally 
dependent upon the institution of government for maintenance 
and protection; that is, it depended on police, now redefined as 
security."133 Tomlins finds early evidence for this manner of re-
definition in Blackstone's emphasis on "aspects of human activ-
ity likely to be disruptive to the moral or social tenor of public 
life" within the list of offenses he outlines under the heading of 
"public police. "134 In seeking to confine police in this fashion, 
Blackstone accorded with the position of leading elites in Eng-
land who posited "law" as a superior regulatory paradigm to that 
of "police."135 Law in this connection meant common law, with 
police taking the place occupied by continental civil law in ear-
lier iterations of this conflict. As such, 18th century defenders of 
the common law, Blackstone first among them, conceived of 
themselves as the direct heirs of Fortescue and Coke in a centu-
ries' -long struggle against the incursion of continental regulatory 
institutions. 
The Commentaries emerged out of a series of lectures that 
Blackstone delivered during the 1750s at Oxford subsequent to 
his appointment as the first teacher of common law in any of 
England's universities, where up to that point only the Civil Law 
had been taught. 136 Consequently, Blackstone devoted the open-
ing chapter (based on his 1858 inaugural lecture as Vinerian Pro-
fessor) to the reasons that make knowledge of the common law a 
131. JEREMY BENTHAM. Ar-; INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND 
LEGISLATION 198 (J.H Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds .. 1970). See discussion in DUBBER. su-
pra note 129. at 68-70. 
132. CHRIS TOMLir\S. LAW. LABOR AND IDEOLOGY IN THE EARLY AMERICAN 
REPUBLIC 76 (1993) (quoting MICHAEL IGNATIEFF AND ISTVAN HONT. Needs and Jus-
tice in the Wealth of Nations: An lmroductorv Essav. in WEALTH AND VIRTUE: THE 
SHAPING oF Pounc AL Ecor\OMY IN THE Sco:ITISH Er-;uGHTENMENT 20 (1983) ). 
133. /d. at 7R (emphasis in the original). 
134. /d. 
135. /d. at 46. Tomlins points to the existence of parallel rights discourse as a critique 
of police on the continent during that time. but notes "In England the ascendancy of the 
law paradigm was more complete than elsewhere in Europe. built as it was on a common 
law constitutionalism which taught suspicion of government. . :· /d. 
136. DAVID LIEBERMAN. THE PROVIr\CE OF LEGISLATION DETERMINED 32 ( 1989). 
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crucial component of university education in England. He of-
fered three such reasons. The first were the benefits that famili-
arity with one's own legal obligations conferred on the ability of 
individuals to conduct their affairs. The second was the likeli-
hood that English gentlemen would be called upon to serve on 
juries and as justices of the peace. And the third, and most im-
portant, was the importance of a foundation in common law for 
those university graduates who would assume the responsibility 
of writing legislation as members of England's parliament.137 
Indeed, as David Lieberman reminds us, Blackstone's pri-
mary objective in the Commentaries was to instruct English par-
liamentarians in the ''science of legislation." 138 Knowledge of the 
common law was essential to that science, because armed with 
this knowledge, legislators would think twice before engaging in 
various ill-advised reforms. By the same token, Blackstone sug-
gested, legislators' ignorance of common law may help explain 
'"[ t ]he mischiefs that have arisen to the public from inconsiderate 
alterations in our laws.'' 139 In support, he cited Coke's lamenta-
tion of "the confusion introduced by ill-judging and unlearned 
legislators" and went on to add that "if this inconvenience was so 
heavily felt in the reign of queen Elizabeth, you may judge how 
the evil is increased in later times, when the statute book is 
swelled to ten times a larger bulk; unless it should be found that 
the penners of our modern statutes have proportionably better 
informed themselves in the know lege of the common law. "1-1{1 
The formal validity of legislative derogation from common law 
was not at issue for Blackstone. Parliament was sovereign and 
ultimately free to legislate at will. 141 His hope, however, was that 
greater acquaintance with common law would engender internal 
constraints on legislators' proclivity to tamper with the law. 
In his innate suspicion of legal change Blackstone followed 
closely in Coke's footsteps. 14c To Blackstone, however, develop-
137. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE. COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 6-10 
(University of Chicago Press 1979) ( 1765-1769). 
138. LIEBERMAN. supra note 136. at 63. 
139. BLACKSTO:SE. supra note 137. at 10. 
140. /d. at 10-11. 
141. LIEBERMAN. supra note 136. at 52-53. 
142. "For any fundamental point of the ancient common laws and customs of the 
realm. it is a maxim in policy. and a trial by experience. that the alteration of any of them 
is most dangerous: for that which hath been refined and perfected by all the wisest men 
in former succession of ages. and proved and approved by continual experience to be 
good and profitable for the commonwealth. cannot without great danger and hazard be 
altered or changed." SIR EDWARD COKE. REPORTS v-vi (1615). cited in JAMES R. 
STOr-.ER. JR. COMMON LAW AND LIBERAL THEORY 38-39 (1992). Stoner cites four dif-
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ments since Coke's time have only accentuated the need for leg-
islative restraint. Writing against unprecedented growth in par-
liamentary legislation, Blackstone was one of the two most 
prominent members of a large and diverse group of critics who 
took issue with the substance and/or style of this legislative out-
put in mid and late 18th century England.143 The other was Jer-
emy Bentham. Whereas Blackstone conceived of the remedy to 
the legislative evils of his day in a more accessible and systematic 
common law foundation for legislation, Bentham ultimately de-
spaired of the possibility of common-law-based legal reform. 
The alternative to which he devoted most of his career was the 
creation of a systematic code in the style of civillaw. 144 
The common law's reactivity, i.e. its ex post facto mode of 
intervention, was a central target of Bentham's critique. The ap-
peal of codes lay in their capacity to provide detailed guidelines 
capable of shaping conduct in advance in accordance with ab-
stract principles. 1 ~' As such codes served as the mechanism 
through which proactive conceptions of continental police could 
be put into place. The distinction between "justice" and "po-
lice," Bentham explained in 1781, was that of the difference be-
tween remedial and preventive intervention: "Justice regards in 
particular offences already committed; her power does not dis-
play itself till after the discovery of some act hostile to the secu-
rity of the citizens. Police applies itself to the prevention both of 
offences and calamities; its expedients are, not punishments, but 
precautions; it foresees evils, and provides against wants." 1 ~" Po-
lice, in other words, is an instrument of social change and poten-
tial redistribution, whereas justice served to defend existing 
rights and institutions. The compatibility of this proactive regula-
tory model with common law constitutional principles would be-
come a central bone of contention in the debates surrounding 
the implementation of Edwin Chadwick's efforts to implement 
in England a continental-inspired program of sanitary reform. 
A disciple of Bentham, Chadwick borrowed various aspects 
of his public health reform from European examples. 1 ~ 7 Conti-
ferent passages in Coke·s writings that are suggestive of similar skepticism regarding leg-
islation in contravention of common law. !d. at 241 n.34. 
143. LIEBERMAN. supra note 136. at 14-9. 
144. See generally POSTEMA. supra note 93 and LIEBERMAN. supra note 136. at 219-
76. 
145. LIEBERMAN. supra note 136. at 238. 
146. JEREMY BENTHAM. THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION 242 (C.K. Ogden ed .. 
1931 ). Cited and discussed in Dl!BBER. supra note 129. at 68-D9. 
147. In his Sanitary Report. Chadwick demonstrated close familiarity with Euro-
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nental writings on public health played an important role in the 
development of Chadwick's ideas, and he cites them throughout 
his 1842 Report on the Sanitary Condition of the Labouring 
Population of Great Britain. 14' But as Chadwick understood, suc-
cessfully implementing similar reforms in England required that 
they be cast as continuous with the common law, rather than 
transplanted from the continent. Chadwick quoted a noted 
German authority who said that to the extent that public health 
reform had taken place outside of Germany, it had followed in 
the wake of German medical police. But Chadwick explicitly re-
futed the notion that British sanitary reform belonged within the 
same German tradition. 14~ Medical police, Chadwick took pains 
to emphasize, ''is scarcely applicable to the substantive English 
law, or to the early constitutional arrangements in which are 
found extensive and useful provisions, and complete principles 
for the protection of the public health. "150 The challenge 
Chadwick faced in this respect followed from the need to recon-
cile the bureaucratic and centralized enforcement process that 
he envisioned with the common law's historical insistence on 
administration through the judiciary. His answer relied on the 
longstanding parliamentary legislation aimed at nuisance abate-
ment.1'1 But his effort proved insufficient to the task. 
The Public Health Act that Parliament enacted in 1848 was 
weaker than the one Chadwick hoped to have passed. Its target 
was the flowing sewage and uncollected refuse that pervaded the 
neighborhoods of many industrial workers. The Act's primary 
novelty was in its definition of such environmental concerns as a 
national matter, and in the creation of an administrative en-
forcement machinery in the form of boards of health. Boards of 
health were made compulsory in locales where the death rate 
exceeded 27 per 1000 (over a period of seven years). Otherwise, 
a petition signed by ten percent of the ratepayers was necessary 
to bring about a local board. The Act conferred on these boards 
power to appoint medical officers and to initiate va~ious sanitary 
projects, but it imposed no obligation to this effect. 1'c In addition, 
pean. especially French. sanitary practices. M. W. Flinn. Introduction to EDWIN 
CHADWICK. REPORT ON THE SANITARY CONDITION OF THE LABOURING POPULATION 
OF GREAT BRITAIN 52. 71 (M.W. Flinn ed .. 1964). 
148. /d. at 52. 
149. /d. at 348. 
150. /d. 
151. /d. at 34--49. 
!52. The one compulsory provision that all boards of health were required to im-
plement was the provision of adequate means of sewage disposal in all newly constructed 
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the Act established a national board of health with relatively mi-
nor oversight functions. Edwin Chadwick headed the national 
board between 1848 and 1854. In the face of intense opposition 
in Parliament, Chadwick resigned his position in 1854.1" 
Edwin Chadwick's main nemesis was Joshua Toulmin 
Smith. A vocal opponent of the 1848 Public Health Act. Smith 
led an ultimately successful campaign to derail Chadwick and his 
National Board of Health. Under the banner of "'anti-
centralization," Smith orchestrated public meetings and mass pe-
titions, and published pamphlets and lengthier works exp<?und-
ing on the principles driving his opposition to the Act. 1 '~ His 
book Local Government and Centralization was the capstone of 
these efforts. 1'' Local government, for Smith, meant more than 
simple local control over decision-making authority in matters of 
local concern. Rather, it entailed a particular method-judicial 
rather than bureaucratic-of regulatory administration. Local 
self-government, in short, meant placing decision-making au-
thority in the hand of juries, when either the liberty or property 
of individuals was at stake.15" 
In delegating decision-making authority to boards of health, 
Smith argued, the Public Health Act of 1848 had dealt a "fatal 
blow" to the "Principles and Practice of Local Self-
Government."1'7 Mincing no words, Smith said that the Act's im-
pact was to "reduce all places into a state of abject subjection 
and subserviency; to impose upon them enormous and lasting 
burthens which shall completely tie up their hands; to fasten a 
horde of functionaries upon the land; and to loosen all the foun-
dations of Law and Property."1'' English liberty itself was under 
attack from "a foreign centralized system of police. " 1 '~ Defend-
ing against it required a return to a judicialized administration 
under nuisance law. 
housing within each board"s jurisdiction. /d. at 71. 
153. ANTHONY BRUNDAGE. ENGLAND'S ""PRUSSIA'i MINISTER" 153-56 ( 1988). 
154. I JOSEPH REDLICH. LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN ENGLAND 144--46 (F.W. Hirts 
ed .. 1903). 
155. 1. TOULMIN SMITH. LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT A:-ID CENTRALIZATI0:-1 204 
(1851). 
156. In direct reference to the relationship between juries and self-government. 
Smith wrote: ··The institution of Trial by Jury forms one. but a highly important. practical 
application of the svstem of Local Self-Government: that bv which law is administered br 
the people ... /d. at i2 (emphasis in the original). · · 
157. /d. at 21. 
158. /d. at 207. 
159. /d. at 204 (1851). 
636 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 24:601 
Nuisance acquired for Smith the status of a constitutional 
principle because it conformed with a bedrock principle of the 
English Constitution: "All Law must spring from the people and 
be administered by the people."1fi.J As he explained elsewhere in 
the text, "Common Law is that Law which SPRINGS immedi-
ately from the Folk and People themselves, and which is also 
ADMINISTERED immediately by the Folk and People them-
selves."161 Trial by jury was what he meant by administration by 
the people. And it was because bureaucracy took over the ad-
ministrative function of courts that it and "individual despotism" 
showed "no difference in principle." 162 
For Smith, the key to nuisance law's capacity to defend 
against despotism followed from the evidentiary burdens it im-
posed on the state. Under nuisance law, in the exercise of one's 
trade or any other activity, one may not create an "annoyance or 
injury to his neighbours" -a principle expansive enough, Smith 
argued, to cover "every question connected with the Public 
Health." 1"3 As he pointed out, however, the distinguishing char-
acteristic of this common law mode of regulation followed from 
its allocation of the burden of proof. The common law, Smith 
wrote. ''throws it upon those who allege any particular thing or 
course of proceeding to be inconsistent with the health of any 
neighbourhood, or its welfare in any respect, to bring forward 
the proof, before the people themselves, that it is as alleged. "104 
This serves as a check against those who, under the guise of pro-
tecting the public welfare, seek to "gain some interested object, 
or to enforce some crude individual notions. "1"5 Because it fails 
to impose a similarly rigorous screening, centralization finds fa-
vor, Smith argued, "in the eyes of interested schemers." The 
common law distinctly guaranteed that there would be no im-
pingement on the use of property rights, except in response to 
evident proof that use of such property caused harm to others. In 
allowing "boards and commissions" rather than judges and juries 
to determine what the public health demands, the 1848 Act, for 
Smith. violated a core constitutional principle.166 
160. /d. at 21 (emphasis in the original). 
161. /d. at 112 (emphasis in the original). 
162. /d. at 28-29. 
163. /d. at 112. 
164. !d. 
165. /d. 
166. Importantly. in putting forth the argument that bureaucratic government infringed 
on the British constitution. Smith was not advocating for the judiciary to invalidate the Pub-
lic Health Act. He was. indeed. a firm opponent of judicial review. Instead he targeted his 
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For Smith. like Fortescue and Coke before him, the English 
constitution served as a bulwark against continental despotism. 
Placing himself squarely within this historical tradition, Smith 
quoted from the writings of Sir Roger Twysden, a 17th-century 
political figure and author on constitutional history who offered 
the following on the distinction between civil and common law: 
And this I take to be the difference between the Civil Laws 
and the laws of this nation: for the maxim there is,- "what 
pleases the prince has the force of law;" whereas this is, -that 
the kingdom shall be governed by no other laws than "those 
which the folk and people have made and chosen. "1"7 
Smith then concluded: "It is thus the peculiar happiness of 
Englishmen that they have not now to strive to achieve for 
themselves the attainment of freedom, but that they can claim it 
as their inheritance from the earliest times. "1(>g Encoded in this 
statement was an oblique reference to the 1848 revolutions that 
had swept through the continent, sparing England. European so-
cialism was the ultimate threat that Smith's brand of common 
law constitutionalism seemed intended to deflect. 169 Within the 
decade, the same concern would trigger the rise of analogous 
constitutional arguments in the United States. 
V. "ANGLICAN LIBERTY," "GALLICAN LIBERTY," 
AND 1848 
Within two years of the publication of Smith's Local Self-
Government and Centralization, Francis Lieber published On 
Civil Liberty and Self-Government in the United States.170 Lieber, 
who immigrated to the United States from Germany during the 
comments at parliament and the public opinion to which parliament answered. In this he 
differed from American counterparts who later in the century would find in a similar line of 
constitutional argument grounds for overturning legislation. /d. at 126. 
167. /d. at 15. Smith identifies the quote from Twysden only by the name of the au-
thor and a page number. 82. 
168. /d. 
169. In an earlier book on much the same topics published in 1849. Smith makes the 
alleged connection between continental governance and the revolutions more explicitly. 
In reference to the use of inspectors by bureaucracies of various kinds. Smith wrote: 
This device of Inspectors is. like the other parts of the centralizing system. not 
original. It is borrowed from those continental nations whose system has so long 
been the especial admiration of the authors and friends of Commissions: and 
the prevalence of which system directly led to those scenes which the past year 
witnessed. 
1. TOULMIN SMITH. GOVERNMENT BY COMMISSIONS ILLEGAL AND PERi'ICIOUS 295 ( 1849). 
170. LIEBER. supra note 20. 
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1830s. is consid_ered among the founding fathers of American po-
litical science. 1 1 The influence of English constitutionalism on 
Lieber"s writings is evident throughout On Civil Liberty and 
Self-Government. whose themes echo those of Toulmin Smith's 
Local Self-Government and Centralization in significant respects. 
Lieber framed the argument in his book around the contrast 
between two conceptions of liberty. the first Anglican, the sec-
ond Gallican. He defined Anglican liberty as the ""guarantees 
which our race has elaborated, as guarantees of those rights 
which experience has shown to be most exposed to the danger of 
attack by the strongest power in the state. "' 172 Gallic liberty was 
''the idea of equality founded upon or acting through universal 
suffrage, or. as it is frequently called by the French, 'the undi-
vided sovereignty of the people· with an uncompromising cen-
tralism. As it is necessarily felt by many, that the rule of univer-
sal suffrage can, practically, mean only the rule of the majority, 
liberty is believed in France, as has been said, to consist in the 
absolute rule of the majority. " 173 Like Smith, Lieber saw self-
government in terms of local rather than centralized political 
power. And. as for Smith, bureaucracy was the antithesis of self-
government: ""Self-government ... does not create or tolerate a 
vast hierarchv of officers, forming a class of mandarins for them-
selves. and acting as though they formed and were the state."' 17~ 
The common law was at the foundation of Anglican liberty. 
··[T[hough we should have brought from England all else, our 
liberty. had we adopted the civil law, would have had a very pre-
carious existence,·· Lieber wrote. m He summed up his assess-
ment of the respective advantages of the civil and common law 
systems in the following words: 
The civil law excels the common law in some points. Where 
the relations of property are concerned. it reasons clearly and 
its language is admirable; but as to personal rights, the free-
dom of the citizen, the trial, the independence of the law, the 
principles of self-government, and the suwemacy of the law, 
the common law is incomparably superior. 76 
171. Along with a number of other educated liberals. Lieber left Germany during a 
period of political persecution aimed at crushing liberal ideas spread in the wake of the 
French Revolution. WITIKE. supra note 14. at 10. 
172. LIEBER. supra note 20, at 53. 
173. /d. at 281. 
174. /d. at 249. 
175. /d. at 211. 
176. /d. at 210. 
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As this list suggests, Lieber associated criminal procedure 
with the virtues of the common law. He contrasted the deficien-
cies of continental inquisitorial procedure with the benefits of 
common law methods of triaL which he termed "accusatorial." 
Among the protections that the accusatorial procedure offered. 
Lieber noted the demand that decisions regarding indictments 
be placed in the hands of grand juries, rather than the execu-
tive.177 
The contrast between Anglican and Gallic liberties was Lie-
ber's way of making sense of England's exemption from the 
revolutions of 1848-49. Theodore Woolsey noted in the introduc-
tion to the third edition of Civil Liberty and Self Government 
(published in 1874) that the book "cannot be read profitably 
without taking into view the events of 1848 and the new empire 
of Napoleon III." 17" Napoleon III was Prince Louis Napoleon 
Bonaparte who, after being elected president of the Second 
French Republic, declared himself emperor in an 1851 coup 
d'etat. The event symbolized the larger failure of a revolutionary 
movement that spread from Paris to much of continental Europe 
in 1848. 
This diffusion was in keeping with the revolution's universal 
message and international ideology. Drawing their inspiration 
from the French Revolution and enlightenment philosophy. the 
revolution's leaders "championed a cosmopolitan humanitarian-
ism based on natural law and the inalienable rights of man which 
transcended all national and racial boundaries.''' 7" In Germany 
the revolution took hold against economic and social disruptions 
brought on by the industrial revolution that reached the German 
states during the second third of the 19th century. As a result, 
the German revolutionary movement included a substantial 
radical communist element. Fissures in the coalition between 
177. /d. at 219. The significance that Lieber attributed to grand jury indictments is 
evident in earlier correspondence between Lieber and the King of Prussia. In a letter 
Lieber wrote in 1845, he reported to an acquaintance on the content of his letter earlier 
that year to the King of Prussia: 
In a letter written from Hamburg I freely poured out my heart to the King of 
Prussia on the subject of the administration of justice. and trial by jury. saying 
that I should consider it fortunate if the time had alreadv come for the introduc-
tion of trial by jury in Prussia. but that a public and oral indictment of the ac-
cused was unconditionally and absolutely required. 
THE LIFE AND LEITERS OF FRA!'iCIS LIEBER 193 (Thomas Sergeant Perry ed .. 1882) 
[hereinafter LEITERS OF LIEBER]. 
178. Theodore D. Woolsey. Introduction. in LEITERS OF LIEBER. supra note 177, at 
9 (3d ed. 1874). 
179. WJITKE. supra note 14, at 18. 
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radical and bourgeois elements in the German revolutionary 
movement ultimately contributed to its undoing. 1'"' 
With the revolution's failure, a wave of German and other 
European immigrants arrived in the United States. By one ac-
count. the number of Germans arriving annually during the lat-
ter 1840s neared 60,000; in the early 1860s it surpassed 130,000.1s1 
Their influence. however, far exceeded their numbers because of 
their geographical settlement and occupational distribution pat-
terns. The Germans concentrated in principle industrial and 
commercial centers in the mid-Atlantic states and in the Mid-
west, where they acquired disproportionate political and eco-
nomic weight. 1' 2 In New York, where a large and established 
German community existed, Germans dominated the wood-
working, clothing and baking occupations by the early 1850s.1H3 
The Forty-Eighters, as they came to be called, included 
people from diverse economic backgrounds and political views. 
Among them was an influential group of radical reformers who 
took on transformative agendas across multiple social and politi-
cal spheres. 1>4 In 1854 one such German group (under the banner 
of the ''Louisville Platform") called for the abolition of the 
presidency and the senate, which would be replaced by a Euro-
pean-styled parliamentary system unifying the executive and leg-
islative functions in one body. Their goal was to create the politi-
cal institutions necessary to eliminate all racial and class 
privilege~. ~ther less well-known ~erma~8ftroups purs~ed simi-lar constitutiOnal reform agendas m 1851. · It seems L1eber had 
in mind their efforts, or others like them, when he noted that the 
''unicameral system must be mentioned here as a feature of Gal-
lican liberty, because it is held by all those persons who seem to 
be the most distinct enunciators of this species of liberty." Link-
ing the call for unicameralism with a desire to substitute central-
ized government for American federalism (an agenda that at 
least one German immigrant leader came to advocate), Lieber 
wrote: "The partiality for a legislature of one house is a neces-
sary consequence of the French idea of unity in the government 
180. /d. at 25-26. 
181. These numbers do not include immigrants who arrived in the country illegally 
and were consequently not included in the official records. BRUCE LEVINE. THE SPIRIT 
OF 1848. at 15 (1992). 
182. /d. at 57-58. 
183. SEAN W!LENTZ. CHANTS DEMOCRATIC: NEW YORK CITY & THE RISE OF THE 
AMERICAN WORKII'G CLASS. 1788-1850. at 353 (1984). 
184. WITTKE. supra note 14. at 1. 
185. !d. at 160-61. 
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or the unity of the state. and actual abhorrence of confedera-
• ~ .. [(".h 
CieS . 
.. The coming of the German Forty-Eighters," John Higham 
has written. rekindled American anti-radical nativism dating 
back to the aftermath of the French revolution: 
These refugees from revolution. among them the founders of 
a Marxist movement in America. brought a whole grab-bag of 
unorthodox ideas. Especially in the South. where German 
opposition to slavery caused alarm, and in the Midwest. where 
German settlement concentrated, the xenophobia of the 
1850's included anxiety over the threat of immigrant radicals 
to American institutions. 1"7 
Echoes of this nativist sentiment are evident in Lieber's dis-
tinction between Anglican and Gallican liberty, and in the role 
he ascribes to the "Anglican race, which carries Anglican princi-
ples and liberty over the globe, because wherever it moves, lib-
eral institutions and a common law full of manly rights and in-
stinct with the principle of an expansive life. accompany it.'''"" 
Conversely. it was up to that race to stop the incursion of Galli-
can liberty into the United States. As the next section explains, it 
is at this very juncture that common law limitations on the scope 
of the police power assume the status of constitutional argument. 
VI. CIVIL LAW, COMMON LAW AND DUE PROCESS 
UNDER THE 14TH AMENDMENT: THE ROAD TO 
LOCHNER 
In tandem with the ratification of the 14th Amendment, 
Thomas M. Cooley published in 1868 A Treatise on the Constitu-
tional Limitations Which Rest ugon the Legislative Powers of the 
States of the American Union.' 9 The core thesis echoed central 
themes of British constitutionalism. Cooley titled the central 
chapter of his treatise "Protection to Property by the Law of the 
Land." Due process implicitly entailed a historical set of prop-
erty rights that has been an element of Anglo-American heritage 
since the Magna Carta.''!(' Regarding the scope of legislative au-
thority under the police power. Cooley wrote that such power 
IR6. LETTERS OF LIEBER. supra note 177. at 2RR. 
1R7. JOHN HIGHAM. STRANGERS IN THE LA'ID: PAn·ERl'S OF AMERICAN 
NATIVISM. IR60-IY25. at R (1965). 
JRR. LIEBER. supra note 177. at 20 
189. THOMAS M. COOLEY. CO,STITl'TIO'IAL LL\!ITATIO!\S (1st ed. IR68). 
190. /d. 
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was "calculated to prevent a conflict of rights and to insure to 
each the uninterrupted enjoyment of his own, so far as is rea-
sonably consistent with a like enjoyment of rights by others. '' 1 ~ 1 
In other words, Cooley explained, the state's regulatory author-
ity in matters of public health was limited to the abatement of 
nuisance under the maxim "sic utere tuo ut alienum non lae-
das. " 1 ~2 The state. as such, was well within its powers when it re-
stricted the use of property in the interest of public safety and 
health. It was up to the courts, however, to ensure that the state 
was not using the public interest as "pretense. " 1 ~3 
A. SLAUGHTERHOUSE TO MUNN 
In the Slaughterhouse Cases, 1 ~4 the Supreme Court first en-
countered the claim that legislation was unconstitutional when 
passed under the pretext of public health. 1 ~; Perhaps not coinci-
dentally, Louisiana, where the case arose, was a civil law jurisdic-
tion. Similarly relevant may be the fact that compulsory central-
ized butchering was a long-established institution on the 
continent. This was especially true in France, where five facilities 
established in 1807 by Napoleonic decree were consolidated into 
one in 1867, the year the Louisiana legislature first debated the 
consolidation of New Orleans slaughterhouses. 1"" Finding the 
legislation a valid exercise of the police power, Justice Miller 
upheld the law for the Court. Justice Field, who wrote the lead 
dissent, distinguished between the provisions of the act that per-
tained to inspection, landing and slaughtering, and those that 
awarded exclusive privileges to one company. The latter were 
invalid, he argued. because they contravened the common law's 
established proscription against monopolies. In this he followed 
in the footsteps of Cooley, who by the early 1850s had already 
condemned monopolies in ordinary trades as the use of public 
191. !d. at 572. 
192. !d. at 573. 
193. !d. at 363. 577. 
194. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). 
195. !d. at 36. Slaughterhouse concerned an 1869 Louisiana statute that centralized 
and otherwise regulated slaughtering. In their brief to the Supreme Court, the plaintiffs 
challenged the state's claim that the law was enacted as a sanitary measure. and instead 
alluded to "legislative caprice, partiality, ignorance or corruption." Brief for Plaintiffs, 
Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873), cited in 6 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND 
ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 537 (Philip B. Kurland 
& Gerhard Casper eds., 1975). 
196. RONALD M. LABBE & JONATHAN LURIE, THE SLAUGHTERHOUSE CASES 41-
42 (2003). 
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power for the advancement of private ends. 1Y' On why the same 
prohibition applied irrespective of Louisiana's roots in civil law. 
Field offered two reasons. The first was that the civil law itself 
adopted the anti-monopoly principle prior to Louisiana becom-
ing a state. But the second, and more important reason, was that 
the Fourteenth Amendment imposed similar common-law-based 
limitations on the scope of legislative power in all of the states. 1Y' 
Justice Field was again in the minority when the Court de-
cided Munn v. Illinois 1~ in 1877. The case concerned a state law 
that imposed a maximum charge for storing grain in a particular 
category of elevator in Chicago warehouses. Field would have 
invalidated the law under the argument that rate regulation 
could not be justified as necessary intervention under the sic 
utere doctrine. But a majority of the justices. in an opinion writ-
ten by Chief Justice Waite, upheld the law.'m In justification, he 
relied on the authority of Lord Chief Justice, Matthew Hale. a 
preeminent late 17th-century common lawyer. Hale distin-
guished between the scope of the state's regulatory authority 
with respect to two categories of property: the first was property 
devoted exclusively to private use Uuris private): the second 
"property ... affected with public interest."'"1 Unlike purely pri-
vate property. where the public interest was at stake the king 
was entitled to exercise his prerogative "for the protection of the 
people and the promotion of the general welfare.··'"' 
In the context of late 19th-century police power debates. 
Hale's canonical texts provided a powerful counterargument to 
those who sought to equate common law theory with the author-
ity of Coke and the limited police power with which his name 
has become associated. A common lawyer himself, Hale was 
well versed in civil law, and his approach to legal history was dis-
tinctly comparative.203 Significantly, his distinction between vari-
197. Alan Jones. Thomas M. Cooley and 'Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism': A Recon-
sideration, 53 J. AM. HIST. 751 (1967). 
198. Slaughterhouse, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 105-06. 
199. 94 u.s. 113 (1877). 
200. The regulation was likewise challenged on equal protection and interstate 
commerce grounds, but the bulk of the Court's opinion focused on the due process claim. 
201. Munn, 94 U.S. at 126. 
202. /d. On the place of Hale's •·concept of 'public interest" in American jurispru-
dence during the 19th century see Harry Scheiber, The Road to Munn: Eminent Domain 
and the Concept of Public Purpose in the State Courts. in LAW IN AMERICA!\' HISTORY 
329,335 (Donald Fleming & Bernard Bailyn eds. 1971). 
203. D.E.C. Yale, Hale as a Legal Historian. in THE SELDEN SOCIETY LECTCRES: 
1952-2001, at 461-76, 465, 468 (2003). Notwithstanding his intellectual attraction to civil 
law. some of Hale's writings reveal significant resistance to the incorporation of civil law 
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ous categories of property (and attendant public interest) reveals 
the influence of civil law writings on rights in coastal areas going 
back to Justinian's Institutes. 2"·1 Neither the majority nor the dis-
sent in Munn addressed the connection between the civil law and 
the doctrine of property affected with public interest. Their ex-
plicit disagreement focused instead on whether the doctrine 
ought to qualify as a general common law principle. or should be 
restricted to a narrow set of circumstances. Waite claimed that 
Hale ·s distinction above has for over two hundred years been 
··accepted without objection as an essential element in the law of 
property.""2"' Field responded that the majority's reading of 
Hale ·s text extended the concept of property "affected with pub-
lic interest"" well beyond the narrow set of circumstances that 
Hale had in mind.2"" To conclude otherwise. Field warned, would 
be to empty the right to property of all constitutional protections 
and to relegate ""all property and all business in the State" to 
"the mercy of a majority of its legislature. "207 Three decades 
later. Justice Peckham. in Lochner, echoed Field's language 
when he asked (rhetorically) whether ""we [are] all . . . at the 
mercy of legislative majorities?"20" The imperative of defending 
against this eventuality was the Lochner Court's rationale for the 
existence of common law limits on the police power-the very 
position which the Court earlier rejected in Munn. 
The potential for abuse of legislative power, Chief Justice 
Waite wrote, ""is no argument against its existence. For protec-
tion against abuses by le~~slatures the people ~ust resort to the 
polls, not to the courts."~ As to the relatiOnship between com-
mon law and legislation (and the status of the civil law, by impli-
cation) Waite offered the following: 
A person has no property. no vested interest, in any rule of 
the common law. That is only one of the forms of municipal 
law. and is no more sacred than any other. Rights of property 
which have been created by the common law cannot be taken 
away without due process: but the law itself, as a rule of con-
doctrines into the common law. See Daniel R. Coquillette. Legal ideology and lncurpora-
tiun IV: The Narure of Civilian Influence on Modem Anglo-American Commercial Law. 
67 B.U. L. REV. 877.931 (1987). HOWARD NENNER. BY COLOUR OF LAW. 6--8 (1977). 
204. For the relevant quote from the Institutes and a discussion of Roman law prop-
ertv cateoorizations see Patrick Devenev. Title, Jus Publicum. and the Public Trust: An 
Hi;torical Anali'Si.L 1 SEA GRA~H L.J. 13. 23-25 (1976). 
205. Mumi. 94 U.S. at 126. 
206. !d. at 139. 
207. /d. at 140. 
208. Lochner v. New York. 198 U.S. 45.59 (1905). 
209. Jfwm. 94 C.S. at 134. 
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duct may be changed at the will, or even at the whim. of the 
legislature, unless prevented by constitutional limitations. In-
deed, the great office of statutes is to remedy defects in the 
common law as they are developed, and to adapt it to the 
changes of time and circumstances.210 
645 
Seven years later Justice Mathews quoted this statement in 
Hurtado against the argument that due process encoded a refer-
ence to grand jury indictments as these historically existed in 
common law. 211 
B. HURTADO TO HOLDEN 
In Hurtado v. California" 12 the Court upheld the constitu-
tionality of indictment by information in a murder trial against 
the claim that the 14th Amendment's due process clause guaran-
teed grand jury indictments in capital cases. 213 As noted, indict-
ment by information was a central bone of contention under the 
Stuarts. Constitutional challenges against indictment by informa-
tion at the end of the 19th century built directly on Coke's com-
mon-law-based interpretation of due process under the Magna 
Carta. The Court in Hurtado rejected this view in the following 
passage (partially quoted and briefly discussed in the introduc-
tion): 
The Constitution of the United States was ordained. it is true. 
by descendants of Englishmen, who inherited the traditions of 
English law and history: but it was made for an undefined and 
expanding future, and for people gathered and to be gathered 
from many nations and of many tongues. And while we take 
just pride in the principles and institutions of common law. we 
are not to forget that in lands where other systems of juris-
prudence prevail, the ideas and processes of civil justice are 
also not unknown. Due process of law, in spite of the absolut-
ism of continental governments, is not alien to that code 
which survived the Roman Empire as the foundation of mod-
ern civilization in Europe. and which has given us that funda-
mental maxim of distributive justice -suum cui que tribuere. 
There is nothing in the Magna Charta. rightly construed as a 
broad charge of public right and law, which ought to exclude 
the best ideas of all systems and of every age: and as it was the 
210. /d. 
211. Hurtado. 110 U.S. at 532 (quoting Munn. 9-1 U.S. at 13-1 ). 
212. 110U.S.516(1R84). 
213. For discussion of the significance of indictment bY information during the 17th 
century see infra at 115. 12-1. · ~ 
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characteristic principle of the common law to draw its inspira-
tion from every fountain of justice, we are not to assume that 
the sources of its supply have been exhausted. On the con-
trary. we should expect that the new and various experiences 
of our own situation and system will mould and shape it into 
'14 
new and not less useful forms: 
Both common law and civil law procedures and principles were 
as such consistent with due process under the 14th Amendment, 
the Hurtado Court announced. The immediate holding pertained 
to criminal procedure. But the case must be read against the rag-
ing codification and labor controversies that took place in New 
York and elsewhere in America in 1884. At the start of the opin-
ion Justice Matthews left no doubt regarding the connection be-
tween the criminal procedure question at issue and the larger 
controversies of the day. "1' 
Prior to Hurtado, at least two state Supreme Courts, Wis-
consin's and California's, upheld the constitutionality of indict-
ment by information in felony cases against 14th Amendment 
challenges."1" ''[T]he words 'due process of law,'" the Wisconsin 
Court explained, "do not mean and have not the effect to limit 
the powers of State governments to prosecutions for crime by 
indictment. ""17 Rather, these words connote only "law in its regu-
lar course of administration, according to prescribed forms, and 
in accordance with the general rules for the protection of indi-
vidual rights. ""1" Change in forms of legal procedure was inevita-
ble in the face of ''the advancement of legal science and the pro-
gress of society.""19 And, the Wisconsin Supreme Court 
emphatically concluded, nothing in the language of the 14th 
Amendment pointed to the contrary.""o The Supreme Court of 
California responded likewise when the issue first came before it 
in Kalloch v. Superior Court""1 and again in Hurtado.""" 
21-+. Holden v. Hardy. 169 U.S. at 388-89 (quoting Hurtado. 110 U.S. at 530). 
215. Justice Matthew highlighted the decision·s significance beyond the realm of 
criminal procedure at the start of the opinion: .. The question is one of grave and serious 
import. affecting both private and public rights and interests of great magnitude. and in-
volves a consideration of what additional restrictions upon the legislative policy of the 
States has been imposed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the 
United States:· Hurtado. 110 U.S. at 520. 
216. Rowan v. State. 30 Wis. 129 (1872): Kalloch v. Superior Court. 56 Cal. 229 
(1880). 
217. Rowan. 30 Wis. at 149. 
21/l. !d. 
219. /d. 
220. /d. 
221. Kalloch. 56 Cal. at 241. 
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Notwithstanding, the appellant in Hurtado had impressive 
legal authority on his side: an 1857 opinion by Lemuel Sha~: 
Chief Justice of the Supreme Judicial Court Massachusetts.--' 
The case predated the 14th Amendment and considered the con-
stitutionality of indictment by information in "high offenses" 
under the Massachusetts Bill of Rights. But Justice Shaw's rea-
soning provided ample support for the claim that the 14th 
Amendment demanded grand jury indictments in felony cases. 
Shaw considered indictment by grand jury to be ''one of the an-
cient immunities and privileges of English liberty."cc~ For evi-
dence he relied in large measure on Coke's specific reference to 
"indictment or presentment of good and lawful men" in his 
commentary on the meaning of ''law of the land" under the 
Magna Carta.2co In lieu of pursuing the more radical option of 
severing due process from both the Magna Carta and Lord 
Coke, Justice Matthews suggested, rather unpersuasively, that 
Justice Shaw misread Lord Coke's writing on this point.2c" 
In similar fashion, Matthews disposed of dicta suggestive of 
common-law-based restrictions on due process in the Supreme 
Court's opinion in Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land and Im-
provement Co.227 In that case, Justice Curtis posed the question: 
"To what principles, then, are we to resort to ascertain whether 
[a particular] process, enacted by congress, is due process?" To 
which he responded with a twofold answer: 
We must examine the constitution itself to see whether this 
process be in conflict with any of its provisions. If not found 
to be so, we must look to those settled usages and modes of 
proceeding existing in the common and statute law of Eng-
land, before the emigration of our ancestors and which are 
shown not to have been unsuited to their civil and political 
222. 110 U.S. at 519.537-38. 
223. Jones v. Robbins. 74 Mass. (8 Gray) 329 (1857). 
224. !d. at 344. 
225. !d. at 343. 
226. Justice Matthews' reasoning as to why Coke ought not to be read as requiring 
grand jury indictments in felonies followed from the absence of distinction among levels 
of offenses in the pertinent text. A literal reading of Coke would thus make grand jury 
"essential to due process of law in all cases of imprisonment for crime·· and not only for 
felonies. Since this is not generally taken to be the implication of Coke's language. it fol-
lowed. Matthews concluded. that Coke mentioned grand jury indictments merely "as an 
example and illustration of due process of law" and not an "essential" element of that 
idea. Hurtado. 110 U.S. at 522-23. This reading is difficult to reconcile with Coke's lan-
guage. see SIR EDWARD COKE. THE SECOND PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF 
ENGLAND 45 (Professional Books Ltd. 1986) ( 1817) (hereinafter COKE. SECOND PART]. 
227. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272.276-77.280 (1856). 
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condition by having ,~een acted on by them after the settle-
ment of this country.--' 
In Hurtado. Justice Matthews refused to find in this passage in-
sistence on ancient British pedigree as a condition for due proc-
ess, and argued that such a reading would divorce Justice Cur-
tis's words from their context. "Settled usage" was sufficient to 
establish that a contested procedure was indeed consistent with 
due process, but was not a necessary requirement for compliance 
with due process under Murray's Lessee. "To hold that such a 
characteristic is essential to due process of law," Matthews 
wrote, "would be to stamp upon our jurisprudence the un-
changeableness attributed to the laws of the Medes and Per-
sians."''~ The ··flexibility and capacity for growth and adapta-
tion." he went on to assert, "is the peculiar boast and excellence 
of the common law . .,,:;(, The passage that Holden and State v. 
Lochner would later quote followed shortly thereafter. 
Having rejected the existence of common law limitations on 
due process, Justice Matthews next offered a positive definition 
of the category of restrictions that due process under the 14th 
Amendment imposed on "the actions of government": 
Arbitrary power, enforcing its edicts to the injury of the per-
sons and property of its subjects, is not Jaw, whether mani-
fested as the decree of personal monarch or of an impersonal 
multitude. And the limitations imposed by our constitutional 
Jaw upon the action of the governments. both State and na-
tionaL are essential to the preservation of public and private 
rights. notwithstanding the representative character of our po-
litical institutions. The enforcement of these limitations by ju-
dicial process is the device of self-governing communities to 
protect the rights of individuals and minorities. as well against 
the power of numbers, as against the violence of public agents 
transcending the limits of lawful authority, even whel,! acting 
in the name and wielding the force of the government.-'' 
The passage is understood by some as endorsing a substan-
tive, rather than a procedural, model of due process."' Read in 
this fashion. Hurtado stands as an element in the Court's pro-
228. Hurtado v. California. 110 U.S. 516. 52H (1884) (quoting Murray's Lessee. 59 
U.S. (18 How.) at 277). 
229. /d. at 529. 
230. !d. at 530. 
231. !d. at 536. 
232. PALJL W. KAHN. LEG!TIMACY AND HISTORY: SELF-GOVER"MENT IN 
AMERICAN CONSTITL'TIO"JAL THEORY 106 (1992). 
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gression towards Lochnerian substantive due process. Under this 
view, Justice Matthews's intent was to emphasize that the 
Court's deference on matters of criminal procedure such as in-
dictment by information, suggested no similar deference where 
substantive rights are at stake. 
In its emphasis on the importance of judicial protection for 
substantive rights, Hurtado did not specify the particular content 
of those rights. Due process in America, Justice Matthews wrote, 
was not a "guarantee [of] particular forms of procedure, but the 
very substance of individual rights to life, liberty, and prop-
erty. "c>> Notably absent in the abstract reference to property is 
any mention of nuisance doctrine or the common law. On the 
contrary, the opinion's broad statements regarding the compati-
bility of due process with civil law-particularly when considered 
in light of its immediate political context-strongly suggest other-
wise. 
C. BETWEEN CODIFICATION AND THE POLICE POWER: 
THE 1880s 
Hurtado was handed down in 1884 against the backdrop of 
an intense political dispute over the passage of a proposed civil 
code in New York. Twice before, the code had passed both 
houses of the New York legislature, only to be vetoed by the 
governor. Following the election of a new governor with appar-
ent sympathy for the code, its supporters reintroduced it in the 
state legislature in 1884. James C. Carter, on behalf of the New 
York Bar Association, led the opposition. Due in part to his ef-
forts, the code met its final defeat in the legislature in 1885.234 An 
important piece of the anti-codification campaign was an 1884 
essay in which Carter outlined his reasons for opposing the 
code.c35 The civil law's inherent propensity toward absolutism 
was a central component of his argument. Codes, Carter as-
serted, are characteristic of "states which have a despotic origin, 
or in which the despotic power, absolute or qualified, is, or has 
been, predominant. "2·'" This correlation did not occur by acci-
dent, Carter further explained: 
233. Hurtado. 110 U.S. at 532. 
234. Mathias Reimann. The Historical School Against Codification: Savigny, Carter, 
and the Defeat of the New York Civil Code, 37 AM. J. COMP. L. 95. 100-01 (1989). 
235. James C. Carter. The Proposed Codification of Our Common Law. NEW YORK 
EVESING POST (1884). 
236. !d. at 6. 
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It followed necessarily from the fundamental difference in the 
political character of the two classes of States. In free, popular 
States, the law springs from, and is made by, the people; and 
as the process of building it up consists in applying, from time 
to time, to human actions the popular ideal or standard of jus-
tice, justice is the only interest consulted in the work. In des-
potic countries, however, even in those where a legislative 
body exists, the interests of the reigning dynasty are supreme; 
and no reigning dynasty could long be maintained in the exer-
cise of anything like absolute power, if the making of the laws 
and the building up of the iurisprudence were intrusted, in 
any form, to the popular will.-37 
Carter offered no further instruction on the criteria by 
which to distinguish polities in which "law springs from, and is 
made by, the people" beyond making clear that a populist de-
mocratic pedigree would not suffice. The similarity between his 
phrasing and that of an earlier-quoted statement by Toulmin 
Smith provides an important clue, however. For Smith, it was 
nuisance law that stood as the paradigmatic example of law that 
both sprang from and was administered by the people."'H While 
there is no evidence to suggest that Carter built directly upon 
Smith's writings, the parallel terminology points to the link be-
tween the era's police power and codification debates: the core 
question cutting across both was the constitutionality of conti-
nental administrative paradigms. 
Within two years of both the Hurtado decision and Carter's 
anti-codification manifesto, Christopher Tiedeman published a 
treatise entitled Limitations of Police Power in the United 
States. c.'" In the introduction, he alluded to the threat posed by 
continental socialism: "the conservative classes stand in constant 
fear of the advent of an absolutism more tyrannical and more 
~nreasoning than ~ny b~fo~e ~~gerien~ed by. man, the absolut-
Ism of a democratic maJonty. - Agamst this threat, however, 
American constitutionalism offered a powerful antidote through 
its bounded police power. In fact, he argued, "democratic abso-
lutism is impossible in this country" as long as courts ensure that 
legislators protect minority rights by confining the police power 
"to the detailed enforcement of the legal maxim, sic utere tzw, ut 
237. !d. at 6. 
231->. See discussion infra at 135. 
239. CHRISTOPHER G. TIEDEMAN. A TREATISE ON THE LiMITATIONS OF POLICE 
POWER IN THE UNITED STATES (1886) [hereinafter TIEDEMAN. LiMITATIONS ON 
POLICE POWER]. 
240. !d. at vii. 
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alienum non laedas. ,w In 1900, Tiedeman published a revised 
edition of his treatise. 241 In the intervening decade and a half, 
dozens of judicial opinions quoted Tiedeman's 1886 treatise with 
approval. As Tiedeman acknowledged at the introduction to the 
1900 edition, some courts rejected his views.243 For both sides in 
this debate, however, it was Tiedeman's writings that framed the 
cardinal constitutional question of the moment: the presence or 
absence of nuisance-derived limitations on the scope of the po-
lice power. 
Like Toulmin Smith before him, Tiedeman conceived of 
nuisance as the cornerstone of a judicialized model of admini-
stration, although Tiedeman seemed to put more emphasis on 
the role of judges, rather than juries. Perhaps more than any 
other author, however, Tiedeman was explicit about the mecha-
nisms through which nuisance limitations subordinated adminis-
trative processes to courts. This subordination began with the 
premise that "[w]hat is a nuisance [is] a judicial question."244 The 
legislature may duly prohibit behavior that threatens an injury to 
others. But establishing the presence or absence of intervention-
~ustifying injur~Jn any particular _instance_ w~s yroperlY_ the prov-
mce of courts:· Only through ngorous JUdicial oversight could 
there be a check on legislative interference into markets that in-
voked as its pretext health and safety rationales. By implication, 
administrative agencies such as boards of health were constitu-
tionally prevented from taking enforcement action on their own. 
On this matter, Tiedeman quoted at length from a New Jersey 
Supreme Court opinion that addressed the authority of a mu-
nicipal sanitary board: 
The authority to decide when a nuisance exists. is an authoritv 
to find facts, to estimate their force. and to apply rules of Ia~ 
to the case thus made. This is a judicial function. and it is a 
function applicable to a numerous class of important inter-
ests .... The finding of a sanitary committee. or of a municipal 
241. !d. 
242. 1 CHRISTOPHER TIEDEMAN. A TREATISE ON STATE AND FEDERAL CONTROL 
OF PERSONS AND PROPERTY IN THE UNITED STATES (1900) (hereinafter 1 TIEDEMA"i. 
STATE AND FEDERAL CONTROL]. 
243. /d. at ix. 
244. 2 CHRISTOPHER TIEDEMAN. A TREATISE ON STATE A~D FEDERAL CO~TROL 
OF PERSONS AND PROPERTY IN THE UNITED STATES 732 ( 1900) (hereinafter 2 
TIEDEMAN. STATE AND FEDERAL CONTROL]. 
245. ..If the harmful or innocent character of the prohibited use of lands furnishes 
the test for determining the constitutionality of the legislative prohibition. it is clearlv a 
judicial question. and is certainly not within the legislative discretion. whether the p~o­
hibited act or acts work an injury to others:· /d. at 732-33. 
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council, or of any other body of a similar kind, can have no ef-
fect whatever, f~r a!ly I?_Mrpose, upon the ultimate disposition 
of a matter of this kmd.-
Sanitary regulation was ultimately marginal to the political 
controversies of Tiedeman's age. Instead, Tiedeman's work 
spoke first and foremost to the use of nuisance as means of up-
rooting labor laws. A staunch opponent of paternalistic legisla-
tion, Tiedeman firmly opposed workhour legislation. He made 
no distinction between workhour limits in ordinary and danger-
ous occupations.247 The scope of the danger that various occupa-
tions posed was irrelevant where the protection of workers was 
deemed an unconstitutional regulatory rationale. Similarly, he 
opposed laws that excluded women from dangerous occupations 
altogether (though he made an exception for pregnant women 
because of the likelihood of certain employment "to prove inju-
rious to the unborn child.")24R He also seemed to make an excep-
tion where workmens' health and safety regulations were con-
cerned. He offered no clear justification for this beyond the 
statement that "[t]he safety and health of a large body of work-
men. gathered together in one place, a mine, factory or work-
shop, are peculiarly endangered, if proper precautions are not 
taken by the employer against the sources of danger."249 Perhaps 
he reconciled workplace-safety rules with sic utere through the 
implicit argument that these rules prevented workers from in-
flicting injury on each other. More likely, he felt compelled to 
bend the principle in the face of the era's staggering industrial 
accident rates and the seeming judicial consensus on the consti-
tutionality of workplace safety laws. The Supreme Court did not 
rule on the constitutionality of workhour limits until 1898 in 
Holden v. Hardy. 250 And in that case the Court implicitly rejected 
Tiedeman's authority. 
D. FROM HOLDEN TO LOCHNER 
At issue in Holden was an 1896 Utah statute that limited the 
period of employment in underground mines and smelters to 
eight hours per day. In an opinion signed by seven of the justices, 
the United States Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's de-
246. Hutton v. City of Camden. 39 N.J.L. 122. 129-31 (1876). quoted in 2 TIEDEMAN. 
STATE AND FEDERAL CONTROL. supra note 244. at 734-35. 
247. 1 TIEDEMAN. STATE AND FEDERAL CONTROL. supra note 242. at 337. 
248. TIEDEMAN. LIMITATIONS ON POLICE POWER. supra note 239. at 199-200. 
249. 1 TIEDEMAN. STATE AND FEDERAL CONTROL. supra note 242. at 339. 
250. 169 U.S. 366.386 (1897). 
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cision, findi~,~}he la.w to .b~ "a vali~ exercise of t~e police power 
of the state. - In his opmwn, Justice Brown reviewed a host of 
previous Supreme Court interpretations of the 14th Amend-
ment's Due Process clause. He summarized this body of law with 
the following statement: ''[I]n passing upon the validity of state 
legislation under that amendment, this court has not failed to 
recognize the fact that the law is, to a certain extent, a progres-
sive science .... "252 In other words, as he explained, the due 
process was not meant to entrench a set of historical common 
law institutions for all time. Rather, "from the day Magna 
Charta was signed to the present moment, amendments to the 
structure of the law have been made with increasing fre-
quency."251 In support he offered Justice Matthews's language in 
Hurtado on the Constitution's compatibility with "the best ideas 
of all systems and of every age." 
"Recognizing the difficulty in defining, with exactness, the 
phrase 'due process of law,"' Justice Brown went on to note that 
it "i~ certain th!lt ~hese w?rd~ img~y a conformity with natural 
and mherent pnnciples of JUstice."- As examples he offered the 
principles that property may not be taken without compensation 
and th~t no person "shall ?e conde~ned in h~,~,person. or prop-
erty without an opportumty of bemg heard. -- In this he ap-
peared to impute to due process a universal meaning more in 
line with the continental higher-law tradition than the particular-
istic precepts of common law. 
Moving closer to the issue at hand, Justice Brown acknowl-
edged the Court's recent decision in Allgeyer v. Louisiana 
(1897)256 in which a statute prohibiting out-of-state insurance 
contracts was deemed in violation of the 14th Amendment. In 
finding a substantive right to contract in the 14th Amendment, 
Allgeyer built on common law formulations of due process, and 
this approach was difficult to reconcile with Brown's conception 
of the clause as embodying natural justice principles. Rather 
than addressing this tension Brown went on to emphasize that 
"[t]he right of contract, however, is itself subject to certain limi-
tations which the State may lawfully impose in the exercise of its 
251. /d. at 398. 
252. /d. at 385. 
253. /d. at 387. 
254. /d. at 390. 
255. /d. at 389-91. 
256. 165 u.s. 578.591 (1897). 
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police powers.··=-- And while ··the police power cannot be put 
forward as an excuse for oppressive and unjust legislation. it may 
be lawfully resorted to for the purpose of preserving the public 
health. safety or morals or the abatement of public nuisances ... " 
After quoting his own opinion in Lawton v. Steele (1894), he 
added the following crucial language: ''and a large discretion 'is 
necessarily vested in the legislature to determine not only what 
the interests of the public require, but what measures are neces-
sary for the protection of such interests.'"''H 
Consequently Justice Brown upheld the workhour limits in 
question but added language that narrowed the decision's import 
to workhour limits in smelters and mines, leaving the question 
open on whether a general restriction on the hours of labor 
would be entitled to similar deference.'5~ In the case at hand, he 
argued. there clearly existed reasonable grounds for the Utah 
legislature ·s conclusion that lengthy hours of underground labor 
thr~atened workers' h~alth. and as such "its decision ,~tpon t~is 
subJect cannot be reviewed by the Federal courts."- Justice 
Brown concluded with the following formulation of the judicial 
test applicable in this and other police power cases: "The ques-
tion in each case is whether the legislature has adopted the stat-
ute in exercise of a reasonable discretion, or whether its action 
be a mere excuse for an unjust discrimination, or the oppression. 
or spoliation of a particular class."2" 1 Standing alone, this state-
ment suggests an expansive conception of the court's oversight 
authority. But this interpretation is difficult to reconcile with the 
opinion's prevailing emphasis upon deference, the necessity of 
legal change in the face of social transformations, and the inde-
pendence of due process from common law institutions. Read 
within this context, Justice Brown's reference to class legislation 
is better seen as an attempt to sever class legislation tests from 
nuisance law, and to reserve judicial invalidation of legislation to 
circumstances evincing clear discriminatory or oppressive intent. 
This interpretation gains support from the fact that the Court's 
most conservative justices, Brewer and Peckham, chose to dis-
sent. It is also consistent with the perception of leading progres-
sives that with the Court's decision in Holden, decades of uncer-
257. Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366. 391 (1897). 
258. /d. at 392 (quoting Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 136 (1894)). 
259. /d. at 395-96. 
260. /d. at 395. 
261. /d. at 398. 
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tainty regarding the constitutionality of statutory limits on work-
hours came to an end. 
Holden was a ''decision of the greatest national impor-
tance." social reformer Frances Kelley declared in an article 
published a few months after the case came down. Once the 
Court had finally taken a position on the issue. Kelly believed. 
there would be no turning back. ''Once and for alL" she wrote. 
"it is convincingly laid down by this decision that state legislation 
restricting the hours of labor of employees in occupations injuri-
ous to the health will not be annulled by the federal supreme 
court on grounds of conflict with the fourteenth amendment to 
the constitution of the United States."'"' She, along with much of 
the era's reform movement, would be in for a shock when. seven 
years later, the Court reversed course in Lochner-ending Hol-
den's brief tenure as a landmark case. 
Signs of trouble were evident within a year when the Colo-
rado Supreme Court- notwithstanding Holden- invalidated a 
state law limiting workhours in smelters and mines. Invoking 
Tiedeman's authority Chief Justice Campbell wrote for that 
court: 
How can one be said injuriously to affect others. or interfere 
with these great objects. by doing an act which confessedly 
visits its consequences on himself alone? .... The maxim does 
not read: So use your own right or property as not to injure 
'6' yourself or your own property.-· 
The sic utere maxim got no mention in Lochner. Further-
more, the Court took no issue with the claim that protection of 
workers' health (and not only the public at large) was a legiti-
mate regulatory end. But. Justice Peckham emphasized: "'The 
mere assertion that the subject relates though but in a remote 
degree to the public health does not necessarily render the en-
actment valid. The act must have a more direct relation, as a 
means to an end . ... '''64 The scrutiny implicit to this test bore lit-
tle resemblance to the deference the Holden Court seemed will-
ing to extend. Instead it followed Tiedeman's precept that "what 
is nuisance is a judicial question." In other words, the Court con-
ceived of its role in reference to longstanding models of common 
law administration. Under these models, what reason dictated 
262. Florence Kelley, The States Supreme Court and the Utah Eight-Hours' Law, 4 
AM. 1. OF Soc. 21. 27 (1898). 
263. In re Morgan. 26 Colo. 415. 426-27 (1899). 
264. Lochner. 198 U.S. at 57 (emphasis added). 
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was ultimately a judicial- not a legislative or administrative-
decision. Applying that test to the issue at hand, Justice 
Peckham declared: "There is no reasonable ground for interfer-
ing with the liberty of person or the right of free contract, by de-
termining the hours of labor, in the occupation of a baker. "26' In 
an oblique reference to countervailing theories of medical po-
lice, Peckham dismissed the cameralist notion by which the in-
terest of the state in a "strong and robust" population sufficed to 
justify a broadly defined authority to regulate in the interest of 
health.266 
This was the closest that the Lochner opinion came to ac-
knowledging the presence of a competing, continental-inspired, 
administrative model. The relationship between civil law and 
due process had occupied the Court from Slaughterhouse, 
through Munn, Hurtado, Holden and up to the Court of Appeals 
in Lochner. Yet the Supreme Court in Lochner avoided explicit 
mention of this debate: the Magna Carta, Justinian, sic utere, 
Tiedeman, and other primary building blocks of the jurispruden-
tial rhetoric of the time are absent from the opinion. 
The Lochner Court was careful to distinguish the circum-
stances in Holden from the one at hand (highlighting Holden's 
discussion of the specific dangers inherent to employment in 
smelters and mines, and especially the existence of an emergency 
exemption under the Utah statutes)."'7 A strategic decision to 
obscure the shift in the Court's position may have been at play. 
In addition to the desire to mollify criticism from the outside, the 
imperative of securing Justice Brown's crucial fifth vote may 
have provided important motivation in this regard. Justice 
Brown's reasons for going along are difficult to surmise. A po-
tential explanation might come from the fact that Brown's career 
was marked by inconsistency earlier on.268 Irrespective, his switch 
helped to obscure the discontinuity between the two cases, lump-
ing Holden in the process into the "Lochner era." The phrase 
connotes an imagined cohesion on the constitutional questions 
of the day. In reality, however, the era was marked by deep divi-
265. /d. 
266. /d. at 60. 
267. /d. at 54. 
268. At the start of his tenure on the Court. he tended to vote with the conservative 
block. most significantly perhaps in Budd v. New York. 143 U.S. 517 (1892): see discus-
sion in Robert Jerome Glennon. Jr .. Justice Henry Billings Brown: Values in Tension. 44 
U. COLO. L. REV. 553. 558 (1973). Later. he was inclined to uphold state legislation. at 
times in the face of rigorous dissents from his former allies. /d. at 567. Consequently. a 
change of heart in Lochner would not have been out of character. 
2007] COMMON LAW, CIVIL LAW 657 
sions consistent with those that have framed the evolution of 
common law history from the start. 
Justice Peckham was accurate when he wrote in Lochner 
that no controversy surrounded the proposition that "there is a 
limit to the valid exercise of the police power. "2m But his framing 
of the issue was rather disingenuous. Whereas the existence of a 
higher-law limitation on the state's regulatory authority enjoyed 
a broad consensus, disagreement on whether these limitations 
were better consistent with common law or continental concep-
tions of reason was at the core of the era's constitutional crisis. 
VII. LOCHNER'S LEGACY? 
With the perspective offered by an intervening century, 
Lochner is beginning to look like an accidental villain. Blanket 
dismissals of the opinion as the work of reactionary laissez-faire 
ideologues gave way decades ago to more nuanced and ulti-
mately less partisan legal-historical accounts. Even during its 
own era. the case seems to have had only a modest impact on the 
strategies of social reformers. 271 ' and was soon followed by a deci-
sion that upheld workhour restrictions for women.271 These in-
sights tend to strip Lochner of its status as an aberrant chapter in 
American constitutional history, prompting the question: "Is 
the_re anythi':g remaining o~ Lochner ~hat_ raises especial,IJ inter-
estmg questions for Amencan constttutwnal theory?"-' Para-
doxically, it may be that the imperative of getting Lochner right 
only increases with the case's normalization. If the case does not 
constitute a radical departure from U.S. constitutionalism, it is. 
at a minimum, a tributary to the historical mainstream. Specifi-
cally for this reason, the case may illuminate the origins and 
meaning of contemporary disagreements over the proper 
spheres and instruments of regulatory governance. 
Lochner revisionism offered an array of constitutional theo-
ries in lieu of earlier assertions that the Court's opinion had 
lacked a principled justification. Scholars writing under the 
broad umbrella of the revisionist school trace Lochner to a range 
of principles and offer divergent conclusions regarding the case's 
doctrinal progeny and contemporary relevance. The writings of 
2n9. Lochner. 198 U.S. at 5o. 
270. Howard Gilman. De-Lochneri~ing Lochner 85 B.U. L. REV. 859. 8n0 (2005). 
. 271. Muller\. Oregon. 2011 U.S. 412. 423 (19011) (upholding a statute limiting work-
mg hours of women in laundries). 
272. Posed by Gilman. supra note 270. at lln5. 
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Cass Sunstein, Howard Gillman and David Bernstein offer three 
prominent examples in this respect. Sunstein 's relevant argu-
ment builds on the premise that due process, for the Lochner 
judges, commanded neutrality.c73 Because neutrality. in turn. was 
equated with "[m]arket ordering under common law"m the 
scope of the police power was to be "limited to the redress of 
harms recognized at common law.'' 275 Similarly to Sunstein. 
Gillman finds the origins of late 19th -century police power ju-
risprudence in a "master principle of neutrality ... c7" Neutrality, 
within this context, demanded ''that government should show no 
favoritism or hostility toward market competitors, but should 
exercise power only to advance a true public purpose. ''c77 Laws 
that deviated from this principle by advancing special or partial 
interests were deemed ''class legislation" and invalidated as 
such.m Bernstein has challenged the class legislation thesis and 
argues instead that "the basic motivation for Lochnerian juris-
prudence was the Justices' belief that Americans had fundamen-
tal unenumerated constitutional rights, and that the Fourteenth 
Amendment's Due Process Clause protected those rights. "279 
Each of these constructs is associated, in turn, with a differ-
ent reading of Lochner's legacy, to borrow Cass Sunstein's 
evocative term. Sunstein locates Lochner's legacy in a host of 
contemporary doctrinal contexts where common law baselines 
have been taken as prepolitical and, as such, neutral.cHo Gillman's 
class legislation thesis, by contrast with Sunstein 's argument. 
points toward Lochner's disjuncture from contemporary consti-
tutional norms. Lochner, within his analysis, is continuous with 
constitutional principles dating to the founding of the American 
republic. But he argues that the Court's turnaround during the 
New Deal marked a revolutionary rejection of these earlier prin-
273. Sunstein. supra note 4. at 878. 
274. /d. at 874. 
275. /d. at 877. 
276. GILLMAN. supra note 6. at 61. 
277. /d. at 20. 
278. /d. at 10. 
279. Lochner and the Origins of Fundamental Rights Constitutionalism. 92 GEO. L.J. 
1. 12 (2003). 
280. Examples of this mode of reasoning, he argues, include the invalidation of cam-
paign finance regulations on first amendment grounds: failure to put government-created 
benefits on equal footing to "natural,'' common-law-based ones; and the subordination of 
"[w]hether rights are treated as 'negative' or ·positive' ... [to] antecedent assumptions 
about baselines-the natural or desirable functions of government." Sunstein, supra note 
4. at 883-89. Sunstein relies on the alleged continuity between Lochner and the latter 
doctrines as a basis for a normative argument critiquing what he views as a misguided 
conception of neutrality in contemporary constitutional law. 
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ciples. He sees the Court's decisions in West Coast Hotel and 
Carotene Products as indicative of a "substantive redirection of 
the Court's role in the political system. "2'' Finally. Bernstein's 
''fundamental rights" thesis conceives of Lochner itself as the 
pertinent moment of transition. Concurring with Gillman on the 
significance of class legislation within 19th-century constitutional 
jurisprudence, Bernstein argues that the Court in Lochner aban-
doned class-legislation concerns in favor of fundamental rights 
analysis. Thus, whereas Gillman sees contemporary fundamental 
rights litigation as antithetical to Lochner's ethos. Bernstein un-
derstands Lochner as the progenitor of Griswold v. Connecticut, 
Roe v. Wade, and Lawrence v. Texas. 2' 2 
Their disagreement on the principle at stake and its con-
temporary implication notwithstanding, all three of the Lochner 
revisionist perspectives described above converge on the follow-
ing point: valid police regulation was that which would qualify as 
nuisance-based intervention under common law.2' 3 Put differ-
ently, where judges upheld laws as appropriate health and safety 
measures the laws were valid irrespective of the choice among 
the above three starting points. Within this framework, judicial 
oversight over regulatory interventions derived from the exis-
tence of substantive limitations on the scope of regulatory au-
thority under the due process clause. The oversight function of 
courts followed by default. 
In placing the question of judicial oversight at the very heart 
of Lochner-era debates, this study turns the prevailing Lochner 
revisionist argument on its head. Within the perspective offered 
here, the question of whether due process demanded judicial 
oversight over regulation was itself at the core. The choice was 
281. GILLMAN. supra note 6. at 204. 
282. Bernstein. supra note 7. at 12-13. As he writes. '"For better or for worse. Gris-
wold and Roe's protection of the unenumerated right to privacy raises many of the same 
issues as Lochner's protection of the unenumerated right to liberty of contract.'" !d. at 56. 
283. Sunstien distinguishes between two steps in the Lochner Court's reasoning. The 
first entails substantive '"limitation of the category of permissible governmental ends ... 
The second step entails judicial "scrutiny of means-ends connections [that] '"operates to 
·flush out' impermissible ends ... The latter step is representative of the nuisance para-
digm. Sunstein. supra note 4. at 877-78. As Gillman discusses. nuisance delimited the 
circumstances under which '"government could impose special burdens and benefits ... 
GILL~AN. supra note 6, at 125. It served this purpose through the nuisance-framed de-
mand for legal proof that "special treatment would advance public health. safetv. or mo-
rality." !d. The argument from fundamental rights indirectlv accords to nuisance. a similar 
function to that which the class legislation thesis does. Freedom of contract (like prohibition 
against class legislation) was not an absolute right, as Bernstein highlights. Rather '"libertv 
of contract was consistently limited by the invocation of common law doctrines that r~­
stricted individual freedom for the perceived social good ... Bernstein. supra note 7. at 46. 
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between judge-based and bureaucracy-based models of adminis-
trative governance. The latter put its trust in government as an 
agent of the body politic acting for the common good: the for-
mer-wary of according the state a role in shaping and improv-
ing society-gave judges and juries ultimate veto power over the 
administrative state. 
The justifications supporting decision-making by juries and 
judges were not one and the same. Juries represented local 
communal norms and as such provided a counterforce to cen-
tralization (as Toulmin Smith. among others. discussed): judges 
were said to acquire specialized reasoning ability through study 
of common law. But in combination. juries and judges repre-
sented an alternative to decision-making by expert bureaucrats. 
and specialized administrative courts. along the continental 
model. The rivalry between the English and continental models 
shaped the evolution of common law history across many centu-
ries. Across much of this history the following question recurred: 
Did the Magna Carta guarantee the common law's supremacy-
or was due process compatible as well with the regulatory insti-
tutions of civil law? Influential segments of the American public 
could be found on both sides of this question throughout the 
19th century. 
Lochner marked the victory of a constitutional theory that 
only a minority of the justices had embraced up to that point. It 
stood for the identification of constitutional due process with a 
closed set of permanent common law procedures and norms. Be-
cause this view had failed to garner a majority on the Court up 
until that time. Lochner signified an important transformation. 
But the difference was more a product of circumstances than an 
outright revolution. It derived in the final analysis from a change 
in the composition of the Court, and a shift in the position of one 
judge. The underlying division in American political ideology. 
and attendant constitutional theory. remained in place-as 
would soon become evident in the context of New Deal battles 
over judicial review of administrative action. 2M The compromises 
284. In 1938. James M. Landis. a leading New Deal advocate. wrote: 
Droit administratif. being the system of law and courts that dealt with the claims 
of the individual against government. to the English mind bespoke bureaucracy. 
The term administrative law had thus the same emphasis. From bureaucracy to 
autocracv to dictatorship is a simple transition. And that transition has fre-
quently been made in the literature of the administrative process. That litera-
ture abounds with fulmination. It treats the admimstrative process as If 1t were 
an antonym of that supposedly immemorial and sacred right of every English-
man. the kgal palladium of .. the rule of law:· 
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spawned by these battles shaped the contemporary American 
administrative state. 
Viewed in this fashion, Lochner's legacy is perhaps best evi-
dent in the realm of environmental law, where the regulatory re-
gime that came into being during the 1970s granted significant 
supervision functions to courts. thus distinguishing it from the 
environmental regimes that rose in parallel on the continent.''" 
Over time, this divergence has given rise to growing tensions as 
the United States and Europe have sought to forge common en-
vironmental and trade regimes. The common law positions judi-
cial assessment of evidence of harm as the test of regulatory le-
gitimacy; this fact assigns a particular legal meaning to scientific 
uncertainty. Though the United States has supplanted its tradi-
tional common law approach to environmental regulation with 
one largely based in statute, the potential for regulation in the 
face of such uncertainty has been the subject of significant trans-
atlantic controversy. Disputes often involve Europe advocating 
the incorporation of the precautionary principle into interna-
tional environmental treaties. frequently against objections from 
the United States."~" Here and elsewhere. the imprint of common 
law ideology may help explain cross-national differences in regu-
latory culture and practice. This is not to say that the common 
law was the sole source of American regulation; rather. the con-
tested status of that ideology throughout Anglo-American his-
tory points to the significance of competing and countervailing 
continental influences. Beyond its capacity to illuminate the 
source of cross-national differences. this historical clash between 
the common law and civil law paradigms can enhance our under-
standing of the origin and meaning of domestic divisions over 
the proper role of courts in the administrative state. 
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